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ABSTRACT
Closing U.S. borders to refugees will not likely enhance domestic security. The United Nations (“U.N.”) and some Western democracies suggest that a policy of integrating refugees may more effectively promote the security interests of both refugees and the
countries in which they resettle. Refugee integration is a multifaceted process requiring accommodation on behalf of individual refugees and host societies. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(“UNHCR”) requires states admitting resettled refugees to facilitate
their integration. Contrary to this mandate, the U.S. government has
not strived to integrate the refugees it has agreed to resettle within
its borders. Instead, federal policy emphasizes rapid and minimal
economic self-sufficiency for refugees, which is consistent with
other government policies that privatize social welfare for the poor.
When compared to a theoretical model of refugee integration, this
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article concludes that U.S. resettlement efforts fall short of an integration process. To the contrary, the U.S. strategy of prioritizing immediate participation in the work force undermines the successful
incorporation of many refugees into American society. This failure
stands to impair the security interests of both refugees and host communities.
Community efforts can help fill the gap between the inadequate
U.S. resettlement program and the UNHCR’s integration mandate.
The Author has presented workshops on U.S. law to educate local
refugees about their legal rights and responsibilities. These workshops—described in this article—reflect one way in which host communities can foster integration, even in the absence of a national integration policy.
Such a local effort can promote mutual
understanding and safety.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One week into his presidency, President Trump temporarily
closed U.S. borders to refugees because of national security concerns.1 While it was an abrupt policy shift at the time, the United
States has a record of excluding immigrants based on race, national
origin, gender, religion, and sexual orientation to protect national
security and prevent cultural conflict.2 Many of these historical barriers to immigration have proved either unconstitutional, unwise, or

1 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (§§ 5(a) and (d))
(announcing the Trump administration’s suspension of all refugee admissions on
January 27, 2017 for at least 120 days and proclaiming that entry of more than 50,000
refugees during the 2017 fiscal year would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States. This order also temporarily barred travel from seven countries and
indefinitely suspended travel from Syria); see also Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed.
Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (revising the previous order after a federal judge blocked
it by similarly suspending refugee admissions, but reversing the indefinite ban on
Syrian refugees, restricting travel from six countries, and making other changes);
U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration Office of Admissions-Refugee Processing Center, Summary of Refugee Admissions as of 31-December-2016,
www.wrapsnet.org/s/Graph-Refugee-Admissions-since-19751617.xls
[https://perma.cc/34CZ-YYZH] (indicating that prior to these Executive Orders,
the United States had increased the number of refugees it admitted in the five years
preceding 2017). See, e.g., Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for
Fiscal Year 2017, Pres. Determ. No. 2016-13, 81 Fed. Reg. 70, 315, (Sept. 28, 2016)
(noting that near the end of his second term President Obama authorized a thirtyfive percent increase in the number of refugees to be admitted during the fiscal year
beginning October 2016—to 110,000—compared to the prior fiscal year).
2 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Rubén G. Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging: Are
Models of Membership Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 4–5 (1998)
(discussing the past U.S. practice of race-based immigration controls); see also
MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 21–22 (2012) (explaining the previous U.S. policy of screening at
the border for “perversion,” or homosexuality). Organized opposition to immigration formed in the United States as early as the 1850s, in part out of concern that
radical politics and other differences brought by newcomers could destabilize local
populations. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 20 (2006) (discussing the rise of the nativist KnowNothing movement in the United States in the 1850s). Laws to exclude or deport
immigrants because of national security concerns are rooted in the late 1800s. Id. at
39. See also MICHAEL FIX ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, HOW ARE REFUGEES
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both.3 Lawyers and others have criticized President Trump’s exclusionary executive orders on similar grounds.4 At a time when record numbers of people around the globe have fled their homes due
to persecution, violence, or human rights abuses, closing the U.S.
borders will only expose refugees to continued risks and fails to enhance safety in the United States.5 Moreover, the administration’s
refugee ban, coupled with its anti-immigrant rhetoric, has fueled
xenophobic and racist narratives further endangering refugees who
have already relocated to the United States.
To the extent that resettled refugees threaten domestic security,
the United Nations (“U.N.”) and others suggest that integrating

FARING? INTEGRATION AT U.S. AND STATE LEVELS 7 (2017) (characterizing the Trump
administration’s Executive Orders as marking a “sharp break with past policy.”).
3 See Aleinikoff & Rumbaut, supra note 2, at 4–5 (noting “constitutional restrictions on state discrimination against aliens” as a feature of the current United
States model of membership); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 2, at 64–65, 183, 188
(concluding that exclusionary practices make immigrants feel unwelcome, rendering them reluctant to integrate).
4 See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (positing that the
executive order violates the First, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 847 F.3d 554, 579 (D. Md. 2017) (claiming that the executive order violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Hawai’i v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 1119,
1128 (D. Haw. 2017) (arguing that the executive order violates the First and Fifth
Amendments).
5 See Volker Türk, Assistant High Comm’r for Protection, Address to the 44th
INTERPOL European Regional Conference: Security and International Refugee
Protection-UNHCR’s Perspective, 2 (May 18–20, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/573c8e987.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170929155015/http://www.unhcr.org/573c8e987.pd]
(“UNHCR has seen time and again that giving primacy to a security focus at the
expense of ensuring refugee protection has failed to bring about the desired results,
often at great expense to taxpayers”); see also Alex Nowrasteh, Little National Security Benefit to Trump’s Executive Order on Immigration, CATO INSTITUTE (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.cato.org/blog/little-national-security-benefit-trumps-executive-order-immigration [https://perma.cc/2S4A-6RAW] (explaining, based on low numbers of foreigners convicted of terrorism-related offenses on U.S. soil, why the Executive Orders will not actually decrease the likelihood of such attacks or increase
national security); see also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR Global Trends:
Forced Displacement in 2016, UNHCR (June 21, 2017), http://www.unhcr.org/enus/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-displacement-2016.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170929155606/http://www.unhcr.org/enus/statistics/unhcrstats/5943e8a34/global-trends-forced-displacement2016.html] [hereinafter U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends 2016] (documenting the record high numbers of forcibly displaced people around the world).
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newcomers into the fabric of society can mitigate this risk.6 The
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) specifically instructs the thirty-seven official U.N. refugee resettlement
states “to facilitate the integration of refugees recognized in their
country.” 7 Through adaptation on the parts of both the host society
and refugees, integration is intended to promote a resettlement
state’s national security by minimizing disaffected ethnic enclaves.
Many Western democracies formulated policies to facilitate this
two-way integration process and build social cohesion in the early
2000s following terrorist attacks in the United States and London.
Integration also works to resolve refugees’ security concerns and
ease the difficult process of resettlement. Refugees have fled from
their homes because of threats to their safety. As they migrate seeking protection, their security often continues to be at risk. Resettlement provides a significant measure of safety, but resettled refugees
face the enormous task of learning about the language, customs, and
culture of their new home. At the same time, many newly resettled
refugees contend with the longer-term effects of the violence or persecution that caused them to escape their prior communities. Adjusting to a new environment within a community unreceptive to
refugees is more challenging and can pose new threats to refugee
safety.8 An integration process can help refugees and communities
6 Türk, supra note 5, at 4–5 (determining that integration within a host community is central to the security of both the host community and refugees); see also
Sergio Marchi, What is Migration Without Integration?, 24 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 22, 25
(2005) (indicating that integration can help prevent immigrant groups from marginalization and becoming a destabilizing element in society).
7 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The Integration of Resettled Refugees: Essentials for Establishing a Resettlement Programme and Fundamentals for Sustainable Resettlement Programmes, 6 (2013), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/resettlement/52a6d85b6/integration-resettled-refugees-essentials-establishingresettlement-programme.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170929204019/http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/resettlement/52a6d85b6/integration-resettled-refugees-essentials-establishing-resettlement-programme.html] [hereinafter U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration of
Resettled Refugees].
8 See, e.g., ACLU of Idaho Launches 10-Language Anti-Harassment Campaign,
IDAHO STATE J. (Jan. 11, 2017), http://idahostatejournal.com/members/aclu-ofidaho-launches—language-anti-harassment-campaign/article_01a5fdd8-10ea5b1c-9e61-[https://perma.cc/37CX-U969] (launching an anti-harrassment campaign in response to increased reports of harassment of refugees across Idaho and
the entire country); Adeel Hassan, Refugees Discover 2 Americas: One that Hates, and
(Nov.
14,
2016),
https://www.nyOne
that
Heals,
N.Y. TIMES
times.com/2016/11/15/us/refugees-discover-2-americas-one-that-hates-and-
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adapt, lending further protection to refugees and the societies in
which they relocate.
The United States has accepted more refugees than all other resettlement states combined.9 Despite its prior status as a haven for
resettled refugees, the United States has not expressly adopted a policy of integrating newly-arrived refugees. If there is any prevailing
policy that guides the layers of government involved in U.S. refugee
resettlement it could be articulated as economic self-sufficiency
through rapid employment. This policy is nested within the broader
neoliberal framework of privatizing social welfare. As such, it is
consistent with other programs for the poor that link benefits to
work and sanction impoverished families and individuals for failure
to comply with work requirements.10

one-that-heals.html [https://perma.cc/X9FL-3QPM] (recounting threats against
refugees in communities across the United States); COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
111th Cong., ABANDONED UPON ARRIVAL: IMPLICATIONS FOR REFUGEES AND LOCAL
COMMUNITIES BURDENED BY A U.S. RESETTLEMENT SYSTEM THAT IS NOT WORKING
(Comm. Print 2010), at 7 [hereinafter ABANDONED UPON ARRIVAL] (reporting tensions and confrontations between refugees and host communities in two U.S. cities
in light of insufficient resettlement resources to the communities); FIX ET AL., supra
note 2, at 2 (noting a “backlash” against the refugee program from communities
concerned about budget shortfalls and unemployment rates); MELANIE NEZER,
RESETTLEMENT AT RISK: MEETING EMERGING CHALLENGES TO REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES 8, 10–13 (2013), http://www.hias.org/sites/default/files/resettlement_at_risk_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS9Z-PV4L] (discovering that communities are becoming resentful of using scarce resources to meet the
needs of resettled refugees, including communities debating banning additional
refugees).
9 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Resettlement Fact Sheet 2014, (2014),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/579afcdc7
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170929160859/http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/579afcdc7] (reporting that 48,911 refugees departed for resettlement in the United States in 2014,
out of a total of 73,008 worldwide); U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Resettlement
Fact Sheet 2015, (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/524c31a09 [https://web.archive.org/web/20170929161131/http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/524c31a09] (reporting that 52,583 refugees departed for resettlement in the United States in 2015,
out of a total 81,893 worldwide); see also, U.S. STATE DEP’T, BUREAU OF POPULATION,
REFUGEES,
AND
MIGRATION,
https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/JTJ5-2WHQ] (asserting that the United States receives over twothirds of all refugees resettled, “more than all other resettlement countries combined.”). The United States, however, is not one of the leading host countries for
refugees. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Global Trends 2016, supra note 5, at
17, and infra note 35, and accompanying text.
10 Julie Nice, Poverty as an Everyday State of Exception, in ACCUMULATING
INSECURITY, VIOLENCE AND DISPOSSESSION IN THE MAKING OF EVERYDAY LIFE 49, 64
(Shelley Feldman et al., eds., 2011).
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This article makes two sets of assertions. First, it contends that
the free-market approach to resettling refugees not only fails to live
up to the UNHCR integration mandate, but undermines it. It
reaches these conclusions by exploring the contours and consequences of the rapid employment strategy. It then analyzes the U.S.
resettlement program compared to a persuasive conceptual integration framework.11 The theoretical model employed identifies interdependent elements of integration, including the foundational element of “citizenship and rights.”12 This analysis illustrates how the
U.S. rapid employment emphasis falls short of—and impairs—longterm integration.
Second, the article prescribes community-based integration
measures to fill the gap between inadequate U.S. resettlement policies and the UNHCR requirement that resettlement states promote
integration. There likely are endless variations of community-based
interactions that can meet one or more elements of integration. This
article, however, focuses on the development of workshops to provide refugees with information on their legal rights and obligations
based on the Author’s experience in coordinating such programs.
These programs not only help meet the UNHCR’s integration mandate, but they support even the limited economic self-sufficiency
standard central to U.S. resettlement efforts.
This work fortifies a weak realm within the scholarly discourse
on forced migration and refugee resettlement. Analyses of integration as a refugee resettlement policy or a normative concept in the
United States is thin, as are scholarly efforts to locate the United
States’ emphasis on economic self-sufficiency within an integration
framework.
The implications of this analysis may extend beyond refugee resettlement. The two-way process of integration would likely promote the well-being and settlement of all immigrants in the United
States, not just refugees.13 Similarly, such a process might help to
alleviate the marginalization of the growing number of poor people

11 See Alastair Ager & Alison Strang, Understanding Integration: A Conceptual
Framework, 21 J. OF REFUGEE STUD. 166 (2008); see also infra Section 3.3.2.
12 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 166, 173.
13 See, e.g., infra Section 3.3.3. (discussing Canada’s approach to integrating refugees and immigrants).
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in the United States.14 While these issues are beyond the scope of
the present work, they provide fertile ground for future exploration.
This article begins by describing the international legal structure
intended to balance the security interests of refugees and host societies. Section 3 turns to resettlement policy trends, discussing the
current emphasis on integration—a strategy that evolved, in part, to
address the security concerns of resettlement states. Here, the article
explains a conceptual model of refugee integration that frames the
remaining analysis. It also briefly reviews Canada’s integration efforts because many policy analysts suggest Canada is an exemplar
of integration success. This Section evaluates the U.S. resettlement
focus on rapid economic self-sufficiency by comparing it to the theoretical integration model earlier described. Doing so supports the
conclusion that the U.S. refugee resettlement program not only fails
to meet the UNHCR integration mandate, but it impairs successful
resettlement for many refugees. Finally, this Section prescribes community-based efforts to promote refugee integration. Section 4 suggests collaborative workshops on law and legal processes offered to
refugees and immigrants as a step which not only tends to support
the inadequate jobs first strategy in the United States, but also facilitates the integration of refugees. This Section provides details of
the collaboration and workshops with the hope that other communities will replicate this project.
2. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK INTENDED TO PROTECT REFUGEES:
DURABLE SOLUTIONS
By the end of 2016, 65.6 million people around the globe had
been forced to flee from their homes due to persecution, violence, or

14 An integration model may well facilitate the incorporation of poor people
into a larger social and economic mainstream, but there is no requirement for doing
so, akin to the UNHCR mandate for resettled refugees. See U.N. High Comm’r for
Refugees, Integration of Resettled Refugees, supra note 7.
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human rights abuses.15 This staggering number of displaced people
continues to grow.16
Despite this surge in forced migration, the general international
framework for protecting refugees has changed very little since the
post-World War II period. The protection regime is grounded in the
1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
and the 1967 Protocol (“Refugee Convention”).17
Drafters of the Refugee Convention worked to balance refugee
security with security concerns of states and host communities.18
The Convention establishes a limited definition of a “refugee” as a
person who has crossed an international border, has a well-founded
fear of persecution based on one of five specified reasons, and is unwilling or unable to return home because of that fear.19 It excludes

15 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Global Trends 2016, supra note 5, at 2. In
2013, the number of people forcibly displaced around the globe exceeded for the
first time those displaced by World War II. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees,
UNHCR Statistical Year Book 2013, 6 (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/country/54cf9bd69/unhcr-statistical-yearbook-2013-13th-edition.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170929161332/http://www.unhcr.org/enus/statistics/country/54cf9bd69/unhcr-statistical-yearbook-2013-13th-edition.html].
16 UNHCR reported that the numbers of displaced people have grown substantially since 1997. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Global Trends 2016, supra note
5, at 5. While the conflict in Syria produced the largest displaced population in
2015, significant numbers of people are being forced to flee their homes elsewhere
in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe (Ukraine). Id. at 6.
17 This convention builds from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which protects people seeking asylum from persecution in other countries.
Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Introductory Note, CONVENTION AND
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 2 (DEC. 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf [https://perma.cc/B987-PZYE].
18 See Türk, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that both security and protection “are best
achieved through an integrated approach.”).
19 “[A]ny person who . . . owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who,
not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it.” United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1,
¶ A(2), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention], as
amended by United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, ¶ 2,
Dec. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].The original convention
was approved in 1951 to protect people who became refugees before January 1, 1951
because of war in Europe. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, The 1951 Convention
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from international protection anyone responsible for serious nonpolitical crimes, war crimes, or crimes against peace or humanity,
even though the person otherwise meets the definition of a refugee.20 Moreover, the Convention allows host states to expel a previously-admitted refugee to protect national security or public order.21
The Refugee Convention also identifies basic minimum standards for protecting displaced people who meet the refugee definition.22 It calls on contracting states to “as far as possible,” “facilitate
the assimilation and naturalization of refugees.”23 The Convention’s
nonrefoulement protection prohibits contracting states from returning a refugee to a border or area where his or her life or freedom
would be threatened because of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.24 In addition,
the Convention obligates states to cooperate with the UNHCR.25
The 1951 Convention, its 1967 protocol, or both have been ratified
by 148 states, including the United States.26

Related to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 4 (Sept. 2011), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/convention/4dac37d79/reservations-declarations1967-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170929161555/http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/convention/4dac37d79/reservations-declarations-1967-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html] [hereinafter U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 1951 Convention]. The 1967
Protocol removed the geographical and time limits. The United States acceded to
the 1967 Protocol in 1968 with two reservations. See id. at 2, 5 (noting reservations
to Article 29, on taxation of refugees, and to Article 24 1(b), on the provision of social
security, to the extent that the provision is inconsistent with the U.S. Social Security
Act); see also 1967 Protocol, supra.
20 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 1951 Convention, supra note 19, at art. 1, ¶
F.
21 Id. at art. 32.
22 Different regional instruments offer additional protection for refugees. See,
e.g., Council Directive 2004/83/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12 (EU); Org. of African Unity
(OAU), Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium
on the Int’l. Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mex.-Pan., Nov. 22, 1984,
(http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=printdoc&docid=3ae6b36ec) [https://perma.cc/NY6N-BU46].
23 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 1951 Convention, supra note 19, at art. 34.
24 Id., at art. 33. The Refugee Convention extends additional rights to refugees
located in states that are party to it, including rights to court access (art. 16), to education (art. 22), to work (art. 17), to free movement within the territory (art. 26),
and to travel documents (art. 28), among others.
25 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, 1951 Convention, supra note 19, at art. 35.
26 Id. at 4.
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The UNHCR addresses the plight of refugees through three “durable solutions”—voluntary repatriation, local integration, or resettlement.27 A durable solution is one that ends displacement so that
refugees can “lead normal lives.”28 First, refugees can be voluntarily
repatriated to their country of origin if the context allows return in
safety and dignity. Alternatively, refugees can be integrated into a
host country that provides initial asylum. This second solution
should allow a refugee to integrate legally, economically, and socially. Finally, refugees can be resettled to a third country that has
agreed to admit them as refugees with permanent residence status.29
Resettlement is offered to less than one percent of the world’s refugee population—traditionally to those identified by the UNHCR as
most vulnerable.30
The UNHCR works with thirty-seven “resettlement states,” including the United States, to implement the third durable solution.31
Of these countries, the United States accepts over half of all resettled

27 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK 28 (July
2011)
[https://perma.cc/B45F-QS82][hereinafter
UNHCR
RESETTLEMENT
HANDBOOK]. The U.S. Department of State recognizes these same durable solutions.
See DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION,
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/about/index.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/JTJ5-2WHQ] (describing the work of the Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration as helping the international community develop durable
solutions, and listing repatriation, local integration and resettlement as these solutions).
28 UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 28.
29 Id. UNHCR defines “resettlement” as follows: “Resettlement involves the
selection and transfer of refugees from a State in which they have sought protection
to a third State which has agreed to admit them—as refugees—with permanent residence status. The status provided ensures protection against refoulement and provides a resettled refugee and his/her family or dependents with access to rights
similar to those enjoyed by nationals. Resettlement also carries with it the opportunity to eventually become a naturalized citizen of the resettlement country.” Id.
at 3.
30 NEZER, supra note 8, at 5. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT RESETTLEMENT, 4 (November 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/hk/wp-content/uploads/sites/13/2016/04/FAQ-aboutResettlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/DEY4-JZML] [hereinafter U.N. High Comm’r
for Refugees, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS] (stating that resettlement generally
“requires the identification of particularly vulnerable people within a much larger
group of refugees.”).
31 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends 2016, supra note 5, at 27.
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refugees, with Canada and Australia the next two largest resettlement states.32 Yet, when considering the magnitude of global forced
displacement, the United States accepts a small number of refugees.33 It admitted 85,000 in the fiscal year ending September 2016,
at a time when the UNHCR reported 22 million refugees worldwide.34 Developing regions in the global south host eighty-four percent of the world’s overall refugee population.35
The U.S. Refugee Act of 1980 (“Refugee Act”) is the first and
most comprehensive federal legislation guiding the oversees refugee admission program and establishing a process of asylum within
U.S. borders.36 It codifies the U.N. Refugee Convention’s definition
of “refugee”37 and allows refugees to petition to make their home in
the United States by means of the durable solutions of resettlement
or local integration through asylum.38 In other words, U.S. law pro-

Id.
From 2013 through 2015, when displacement was at record levels, the
United States admitted less than 210,000 refugees from outside its borders and
granted asylum to less than 46,000 within the United States. The U.S. State Department, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, reports that 209,846 refugees
were admitted between 2013 and 2015, inclusive. U.S. STATE DEP’T, BUREAU OF
POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, CUMULATIVE SUMMARY OF REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS (Dec. 31, 2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/releases/statistics/251288.htm. [https://perma.cc/F8HU-4R8L]. The total number who have
gained asylum status during those three years is 47,666. NADWA MOSSAAD, DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF IMMIGR. STAT., REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2015 6 (Nov. 2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/DWM6-9FW9].
34 See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends 2016, supra note 5 (reporting 22.5 million refugees at the end of calendar year 2016); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Refugee Arrivals, supra note 1 (reporting total arrivals for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2016 at 84,995).
35 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends 2016, supra note 5, at 2.
36 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (amending the
Immigration and Nationality Act and the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of
1962). See THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 813 (7th ed. 2012) (noting that Congress was “focused on reforming the overseas refugee admissions programs.”).
37 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201 (1980); Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (2014).
38 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §§ 207 (resettlement), 208 (asylum)
(1980); Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157 (resettlement), 1158 (asylum) (2014).
32
33
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vides two avenues for a person to acquire refugee status: as a resettled refugee from outside the United States and as a successful asylum seeker from within the United States or at a U.S. port of entry.
For this first avenue, the Refugee Act authorizes the President,
in consultation with Congress, to establish a maximum number each
year of refugees located outside of the United States who will be allowed to resettle in the country.39 These refugees are often living in
camps, settlement regions, or urban centers near conflict areas when
they apply for resettlement.40 The U.S. government works with the
UNHCR to identify and evaluate candidates for resettlement. Once
refugees approved for resettlement arrive in the United States at a
location selected by the U.S. government, they work with a contracting non-governmental organization (“NGO”) that receives federal
money to help each newcomer.41
The second avenue of gaining refugee status in the United States
is very different. Under the Refugee Act, the United States provides
asylum to people who travel to the United States and successfully
petition to remain based on meeting the definition of “refugee.”42 A
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (a) (2017).
See NEZER, supra note 8, at 7 (reporting that many refugees have spent years
in refugee camps prior to resettlement).
41 See Donald Kerwin, The Faltering U.S. Refugee Protection System: Legal and Policy Responses to Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Others in Need of Protection, REFUGEE
SURV. Q. 1, 6-8 (describing the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, including the role
of NGOs, or “voluntary resettlement agencies.”).
42 Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–212, § 208 (1980); Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1158 (2014). Any immigrant present in the United States, or
at a port of entry, may claim they meet the definition of a refugee and seek asylum
in order to legally remain in the United States. The two primary ways of seeking
asylum are affirmative and defensive. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 36, at 814. A
less significant route to asylum is derivative asylum status as the spouse or child of
a person granted asylum. In 2014, the United States granted asylum to 4,735
spouses and children. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (last visited July 8, 2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2014.pdf. [https://perma.cc/8S26-EPEN]. With an affirmative
claim, an immigrant submits a petition to a U.S. Customs and Immigration Service
(“USCIS”) asylum officer, under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 36, at 815. A defensive asylum request occurs
within the context of removal proceedings before an immigration judge in the Executive Office for Immigration Review of the Department of Justice. Id. at 816. An
immigrant without proper authorization to enter the United States may be subjected to an expedited removal process at a U.S. border or other port of entry. Id. at
817. If the person claims a fear of returning to their home country, he or she will
undergo a “credible fear” interview with a USCIS asylum officer. 8 U.S.C. § 1225
(2012). If the immigrant establishes a significant possibility of asylum, USCIS refers
39
40
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successful claimant who is granted asylum—an asylee—may remain in the United States, but is not offered the same kind of assistance initially extended to resettled refugees.43
Many scholars and practitioners consider the UNHCR’s three
durable solutions to be outdated and ineffective.44 In particular,
these options fail to adequately protect refugees from ongoing
threats to their personal safety and provide no remedy for the growing numbers of refugees who are victims of protracted conflicts.45
Refugees leave their homes because of threats to their security from
state agents or from actors the government is unable or unwilling to
control.46 As they migrate for protection, their security often continues to be at risk by conflict in surrounding areas, landmines, and

the case to immigration court. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 5, at 817. The process
from here is similar to an affirmative claim. The numbers of asylum grants (both
affirmative and defensive) has been decreasing. In 2012, 28,115 individuals were
granted asylum, decreasing to 25,100 in 2013, and again to 23,533 in 2014. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW REPORT, REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2014 (last visited
July 8, 2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2014.pdf. [https://perma.cc/JNW4-GYWE].
43 Lindsay M. Harris, From Surviving to Thriving?: An Investigation of Asylee Integration in the United States, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 29, 45 (2016). Nonetheless, both resettled refugees and asylees are entitled to some federal benefits,
such as Social Security, Medicaid, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
Id. at 44.
44 See, e.g., Debra Pressé & Jessie Thomson, The Resettlement Challenge: Integration of Refugees from Protracted Refugee Situations, 25 REFUGE: CANADA’S J. ON
REFUGEES 94 (2008); Nora Tyeklar, The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Process: A Path to
Self-Sufficiency or Marginalization?, in REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES:
LANGUAGE, POLICY, PEDAGOGY 152, 155 (Emily M. Feuerherm & Vaidehi Ramanathan, ed., 2016) (suggesting that “oftentimes, such ‘durable solutions’ are durable
not for refugees, but for the status quo that upholds the positions of dominant institutions and ideologies already in place.”).
45 The UNHCR reports that two-thirds of all refugees were in “protracted refugee situations” at the end of 2016, defined as “one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more
in a given asylum country.” U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Global Trends 2016,
supra note 5, at 22.
46 To meet the legal definition of a refugee under U.S. law, a person must
demonstrate persecution or fear of persecution from the government in the country
from which the person fled or from actors the government was unwilling or unable
to control. See, e.g., Afriyie v. Holder, 613 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2010); M.A.
A26851062 v. U.S. I.N.S., 858 F.2d 210, 218 (4th Cir. 1988).
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outlaws who exploit their vulnerability, especially targeting women
and children.47
Even from the relative safety of a first host country, new security
threats can emerge from inhospitable local populations or criminal
activity in refugee camps.48 Millions of refugees are exiled to these
camps or other holding areas for indefinite periods of time, unable
to access any of the “solutions.”49 Ongoing conflict prevents their
return to war-torn homes and inhospitable conditions preclude their
settling permanently in the country of first asylum.50
The refugees who survive these significant security challenges
have themselves been perceived as security threats since the attacks
in the United States on September 11, 2001. Governments worldwide have tightened refugee admissions procedures and turned
asylum seekers away because of national security concerns.51 Apprehensions of resettlement states render relocation to a third country elusive for most refugees.
While the prior discussion introduces the legal definition of a
refugee, it does not completely address different socio-linguistic
meanings of the term “refugee.” Many resettled refugees, or people
who become asylees after arrival in the United States, do not want
to be defined by a legal status associated with difference and exclusion. A refugee or asylee may wish to be known as a former refugee,
an immigrant, a citizen, or by adopting different self-references in
different contexts, or eschewing any labels.52 While acknowledging

47 Volker Türk, Forced Migration and Security, 15 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 113, 114,
117 (2003) [hereinafter Türk, Forced Migration].
48 Id., at 113, 117. See also DeBrenna LaFa Agbéjyiga et al., Expanding Our Community: Independent and Interdependent Factors Impacting Refugees’ Successful Community Resettlement, 13 ADVANCES IN SOC. WORK 306 (2012) (reporting on refugee camp
conditions, including torture, starvation, rape, assault, and harassment).
49 Pressé & Thomson, supra note 44, at 94 (“More and more refugees find themselves “warehoused” in refugee camps for years, without access to a durable solution.”).
50 See, e.g., Migration: Looking for a Home, THE ECONOMIST, May 28, 2016 (explaining that many Syrian refugees in Germany fled not from Syria directly but
from Lebanon where they were attempting to wait out the conflict).
51 Türk, Forced Migration, supra note 47, at 115.
52 Emily M. Feuerherm & Vaidehi Ramanathan, Introduction to Refugee Resettlement in the United States: Language, Policies, Pedagogies, in REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES, LANGUAGE POLICE, PEDAGOGY 1, 2 (Emily M. Feuerherm &
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this spectrum of preferences, this article uses the term refugee in its
legal sense, which means any person who lawfully resides in the
United States because of having met the 1980 Refugee Act and Refugee Convention’s definition of a refugee.
3. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
Large-scale forced migration across the globe has brought attention to various theories and practices of refugee relocation that have
evolved over time. These approaches run the gamut from assimilation to multiculturalism, with integration located somewhere between these poles. Many resettlement states—such as Canada—
have adopted integration as a policy for resetting refugees. This section briefly outlines Canada’s integration measures because policy
analysts have touted them as a model of success. By contrast, the
United States has not adopted an integration policy. Instead, the
U.S. resettlement program champions rapid economic self-sufficiency, reflecting a neoliberal economic philosophy that undermines
long-term integration. This Section asserts that introducing resettled refugees to their legal rights and responsibilities through a community-based workshop supports integration, and also advances
the more limited goal of speedy economic independence.
3.1. Theory and Policy
During the early part of the 20th century, many western democracies sought to assimilate immigrants.53 Host societies expected

Vaidehi Ramanathan, eds., 2016) (suggesting that some refugees may avoid the label to distance themselves from any perceived negative connotations, while others
actively use it to access rights or resources).
53 See, e.g., Nicole Ives, More Than a “Good Back”: Looking for Integration in Refugee Resettlement, 24 REFUGE: CANADA’S J. ON REFUGEES 54, 55 (2007) (“[t]raditional
adaptation research is based on the assumption that increased participation in the
host culture requires detachment from the culture of origin”) (citing MILTON M.
GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE (1964) and H.B.M. Murphy, The Assimilation of Refugee Immigrants in Australia, 5 POPULATION STUD. 179 (1952)).
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newcomers to assimilate into the mainstream and become indistinguishable from it.54 Assimilationism eventually gave way in the
1960s to a multicultural approach, or ethnic pluralism.55 Different
groups of immigrants were expected to co-exist with host societies,
but were encouraged to maintain their independent cultural and religious identities.56
Multiculturalism lost favor after terrorist incidents occurred in
Western democracies, notably the September 11, 2001 attacks in the
United States and the July 7, 2005 London bombings. Critics blamed
multiculturalism for fostering ethnic enclaves and cultural separatism.57 Some suggested that multiculturalism facilitated terrorism.58
Beginning in the early 2000s, Western democracies generally have
adopted policies to integrate refugees. Integrating newcomers into
a host society reflects the view that a middle road between assimilation and multiculturalism will best foster social cohesion and
safety.59
54 See Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 174–75; Marko Valenta & Nihad Bunar,
State Assisted Integration: Refugee Integration Policies in Scandinavian Welfare States: the
Swedish and Norwegian Experience, 23 J. OF REFUGEE STUD. 463, 468 (2010); see also DAN
PFEFFER, GROUP INTEGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM: THEORY, POLICY, AND
PRACTICE 47 (2015) (discussing the Chicago School of sociologists and defining assimilation as “‘a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and
groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and
groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in
a common cultural life’”) (quoting ROBERT EZRA PARK & ERNEST WATSON BURGESS,
INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY 735 (1969)).
55 See, e.g., Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 174; IRENE BLOEMRAAD, BECOMING A
CITIZEN: INCORPORATING IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA 109 (2006) (describing the shift in the United States away from assimilation
towards diversity, concurrent with the civil rights movement in the 1960s).
56 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 174–75.
57 Melinda McPherson, ‘I Integrate, Therefore I Am’: Contesting the Normalizing
Discourse of Integrationism through Conversations with Refugee Women, 23 J. OF REFUGEE
STUD. 546, 550 (2010). But see Peter Kivisto, Introduction: The Puzzle of Incorporation
and Solidarity in, THE SOCIOLOGICAL Q. 581, 581 (2015) (arguing that multiculturalism
is misunderstood and that it is about incorporation rather than separateness).
58 Jenny Phillimore, Implementing Integration in the UK: Lessons for Integration
Theory, Policy and Practice, 40 POL’Y & POLITICS 525, 528 [hereinafter Phillimore, Implementing Integration] (explaining that the backlash in the United Kingdom against
multiculturalism began in 2006 from growing beliefs that multiculturalism promoted separateness and terrorism and worked against shared common values)
(quoting S. VERTOVEC & S. WESSENDORF, THE MULTICULTURALISM BACKLASH 1 (2010)).
59 McPherson, supra note 57, at 547 (describing integration as a “middle road”
between the “extremes of assimilationism and multiculturalism,” but suggesting
that integrationism remains focused on conformance).
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3.1.1. Refugee Integration
While social scientists have studied immigrant incorporation in
general, scholarship from U.S. analysts on refugee integration as a
policy or normative concept is largely lacking.60 Much of the normative work on refugee integration stems from scholars outside of
the United States.61 U.S. social work professors and health care
scholars have surveyed refugees for indicators of successful resettlement or cultural adaptation, often concentrating on specific nationalities or ethnic groups.62 Legal scholarship tends to center on critiques of the mechanics and funding for the U.S. Resettlement
Assistance Program (“USRAP”).63

See, e.g., RICHARD ALBA & NANCY FONER, STRANGERS NO MORE: IMMIGRATION
CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATION IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE
(2015), and Aleinikoff & Rumbaut, supra note 2 (analyzing immigrant integration
in general); see also FIX, et al., supra note 2 (proporting to measure refugee integration through limited data on employment rates and other economic indicators);
DAVID SYSSEGAARD KALLICK & SILVA MATHEMA, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS,
REFUGEE INTEGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES, June 2016 (providing data related to
Bosnian, Burmese, Hmong, and Somali immigrants—not specifically refugees—
identifying a “high degree of correspondence between people in these groups and
refugees.”) Id. at 43.
61 See, e.g., McPherson, supra note 57; Jenny Phillimore & Lisa Goodson, Making
a Place in the Global City: The Relevance of Indicators on Integration, 21 J. OF REFUGEE
STUD. 305 (2004); Kathleen Valtonen, From the Margin to the Mainstream: Conceptualizing Refugee Settlement Processes, 17 J. OF REFUGEE STUD. 70, 76 (2004) (reporting on
a study of refugees and asylees in Finland).
62 See, e.g., Fern R. Hauck, et al., Factors Influencing the Acculturation of Burmese,
Bhutanese, and Iraqi Refugees into American Society: Cross-Cultural Comparisons, 12 J.
OF IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE STUD. 331 (2014); Ives, supra note 53, at 54; Isok Kim, Beyond Trauma: Post-resettlement Factors and Mental Health Outcomes Among Latino and
Asian Refugees in the United States, J. OF IMMIGR. & MINORITY HEALTH, 1–9 (2015);
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN INSTITUTE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL
ASSAULT & NORTH CAROLINA AGRICULTURAL AND TECHNICAL STATE UNIVERSITY, THE
CONTINUITY OF RISK: A THREE-CITY STUDY OF CONGOLESE WOMEN-AT-RISK RESETTLED
IN THE U.S. 23 (Sept. 2014) http://sites.utexas.edu/idvsa/the-continuity-of-risk-athree-city-study-of-congolese-women-at-risk-resettled-in-the-u-s/
[https://perma.cc/V7RZ-CM3N] [hereinafter CONTINUITY OF RISK] (highlighting
the U.S. resettlement experiences of refugees from specific countries).
63 See, e.g., Ives, supra note 53; Stephen Meili, US Refugee Resettlement Policy and
International Human Rights Treaty Obligations: A Mixed Record, 2 INT. J. MIGRATION &
BORDER STUD. 1, 13 (2016) (finding that the availability of health and social welfare
programs to refugees in the United States is laudable “at least as written” but that
60

AND THE
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There is no universally accepted definition of—or model for—
refugee integration.64 Many scholars view integration as an interactive and multidimensional process involving roles for a host community and its institutions, as well as for the refugees themselves.65
The UNHCR also considers integration to be a multidimensional
process, suggesting that: “Integration in the refugee context is the
end product of a multifaceted and on-going process, of which selfreliance is but one part. From the host society, it requires communities that are welcoming and responsive to refugees and for public
institutions to meet the needs of a diverse population. Integration
also requires a preparedness on the part of the refugees to adapt to
the host society, without having to forego their own cultural identity.”66

programs are significantly impaired by their short, eight-month duration and income eligibility requirements, as well as the language barriers and other cultural
impediments that have resulted in many refugees failing to receive program services.); GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, REFUGEE
CRISIS IN AMERICA: IRAQIS AND THEIR RESETTLEMENT EXPERIENCE, 2009, http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/hir_papers/4
[https://perma.cc/2A2P-GGBS];
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EXAMINATION OF CHALLENGES AND
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS (May 2010),
https://sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/IRCFINALREPORT_0.pdf.
64 Ager & Strang supra note 11, at 167 (quoting CASTLES, ET AL., INTEGRATION:
MAPPING THE FIELD (2001)).
65 Phillimore & Goodson, supra note 61, at 308–09. Alison Strang & Alastair
Ager, Refugee Integration: Emerging Trends and Remaining Agendas, 23 J. OF REFUGEE
STUD. 589, 600 (2010) [hereinafter Strang & Ager, Emerging Trends]. But see
Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra note 58, at 529 (explaining that while academics tend to view integration as a two-way process, governmental integration
policy in the United Kingdom “operates as if integration is one way,” and appears
to take an assimilationist approach).
66 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration – A Fundamental Component in
Supporting Diverse Societies, 1 (Jan. 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/56a9decf5.pdf
[hereinafter U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration – A Fundamental Component]. While the UNHCR has defined integration, it has not prescribed specific policies for an integration program. Rather, it maintains that “there is no single, set
prescription for the establishment and delivery of an integration programme.”
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration of Resettled Refugees, supra note 7 at 8.
Nonetheless, the UNHCR has identified three “inter-related and quite specific dimensions” of integration: 1) a legal process, under which resettlement states grant
refugees progressively broader rights and entitlements generally commensurate
with those enjoyed by citizens; 2) an economic process, through which refugees become progressively less reliant on state aid; and 3) a social and cultural process that
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Another source succinctly concludes that integration is “the ability to participate fully in economic, social, cultural and political activities, without having to relinquish one’s own distinct ethnocultural identity and culture. It is at the same time a process by which
settling persons become part of the social, institutional, and cultural
fabric of society.”67
3.1.2. Refugee Integration Model
Perhaps related to the difficulties of precisely defining integration, there are few theoretical models for refugee integration. In an
influential work published in 2008, British scholars Alastair Ager
and Alison Strang presented what they term a “mid-level theory”
that conceptualizes the key elements of refugee integration.68 In
identifying a hierarchy of ten interdependent domains of integration, Ager and Strang relied on existing literature of refugee integration, as well as fieldwork in refugee resettlement and other data.69
Exploring this framework in more detail provides a baseline for assessing the present refugee resettlement priorities in the United
States, leading to the conclusion that the U.S. resettlement program
does not aspire to integration. It also sets the stage for this article’s
argument that community-based education for refugees on legal
rights and responsibilities contributes to successful refugee integration.
Ager and Strang’s framework identifies the following ten domains of integration, classifying them into different tiers according
to the functions they serve. These domains include: 1) employment,

enables refugees to live within a host community without discrimination or exploitation and to actively contribute to the social life of their new country. U.N. High
Comm’r for Refugees, Integration – A Fundamental Component, supra note 66, at 1.
67 Valtonen, supra note 61, at 74 (citing Raymond Breton, Report of the Academic
Advisory Panel on the Social and Cultural Impacts of Immigration, CANADA: RESEARCH
DIVISION, STRATEGIC PLANNING AND RESEARCH, IMMIGRATION POLICY GROUP,
EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION (1992)).
68 Ager & Strang, supra note 11.
69 Id. at 167–69.
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2) housing, 3) education, and 4) health;70 5) social bridges,71 6) social
bonds,72 and 7) social links;73 8) language and cultural knowledge,
and 9) safety and stability;74 and 10) citizenship and rights. This final
element of citizenship and rights is the foundation of the integration
framework.
Public policy tends to focus on the first four domains: employment, housing, education, and health.75 While these domains reflect
important aspects of integration into a new society, reliance on them
alone to define and measure integration is incomplete. For example,
an assessment of employment data depends on who has the legal
right to work, and what legal safety nets might exist for those unable
to work. This concern led Ager and Strang to inquire about the
“standards and expectations” of a society to help facilitate a meaningful evaluation of integration within that society.76 Addressing
that question led to the identification of citizenship and rights as the
foundation on which Ager and Strang’s integration model rests.
Ager and Strang leave the parameters of citizenship and rights
porous, indicating that the terms are informed by each state’s notions of nationhood and identity. Yet their discussion of this domain
suggests a significance broader than legal citizenship and its associated rights.77 At its heart, this domain suggests the values and practices, including rights and responsibilities, that define membership
70 Id. at 169 (identifying four domains—employment, housing, education, and
health— as the “markers and means” domains, considered both as indicators of
successful integration as well as paths to achieve integration).
71 Id. at 179 (defining social bridges as the relationship between refugees and
host communities).
72 Social bonds are the connections that link members of a group, such as family or “like-ethnic groups.” See id. at 178 (noting the positive impact of maintaining
connections with family and “like-ethnic groups” on integration).
73 Social links reflect “connections between individuals and structures of the
state, such as government services.” Id. at 181. These three domains—social
bridges, social bonds, and social links—form the “social connections” tier that
drives the process of integration at a local level. See id. at 177.
74 These two domains comprise the “facilitators” tier that helps to remove barriers to integration. See id. at 181.
75 Joanne Van Selm, Refugee Resettlement, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
REFUGEE AND FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES 512, 521 (Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, et al.,
eds., 2014) (noting that European countries focus programs on housing, education
and healthcare, while the United States emphasizes employment).
76 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 173.
77 Audrey Macklin, Who is the Citizen’s Other? Considering the Heft of Citizenship,
8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 333, 334 (2007) (defining legal citizenship as “formal
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in a polity.78 Integration within the polity requires an articulation of
the norms and expectations associated with membership. In other
words, becoming integrated reflects the idea that both existing
members of the polity and newcomers understand what it means to
belong and to participate in the civic, political, social, and economic
life of society.79
The community law and justice workshops discussed in Section
4 help to familiarize refugees with the rights and responsibilities of
incorporation in society. As such, the workshops contribute to this
foundation of integration. The workshops also strengthen the social
connections domains (social bridges, bonds, and links). Social
bridges are constructed through interaction between refugee participants and dozens of volunteer lawyers, judges, and law students
from the community. Social bonds are fashioned because refugees
work with others from within their ethnic groups and with those
sharing the same language but who hail from different communities. Social links are created by fostering interaction between refugees and state actors, notably judges, police, as well as public prosecutors and defenders.
The intentions and aspirations of refugees contribute substantially to the process of integration.80 Importantly, refugees have
identified understanding their rights and duties in their new society
as a resettlement goal.81 The author of one study found that refugees
were:

status of membership in a state, or nationality as it is understood in international
law”, and characterized by associated rights that commonly include the “right to
enter and remain in the territory, access to consular assistance and diplomatic protection, and the franchise.”).
78 For example, this foundational domain is central to a version of the United
Kingdom’s policy describing integration “as the process that takes place when refugees are empowered to achieve their full potential as members of British society
to contribute to the community, and become fully able to exercise the rights and
responsibilities that they share with other residents.” Ager & Strang, supra note 11,
at 175 (quoting HOME OFFICE, INTEGRATION MATTERS: A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
REFUGEE INTEGRATION, 2005).
79 MOTOMURA, supra note 2, at 13. Citizenship in this sense reflects “social citizenship,” rather than the more restrictive legal citizenship; the “package of rights,
responsibilities, entitlements, duties, practices and attachments that define membership in a polity.” Macklin, supra note 77, at 334.
80 See Strang & Ager, Emerging Trends, supra note 65, at 595.
81 Valtonen, supra note 61, at 76 (reporting on a study of refugees and asylees
in Finland).
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acutely aware of their lack of information and understanding
of the structure and organization of the formal institutions of
society, and of their position in relation to these. Such information is critical for grasping the parameters of their membership in the society, and for gauging the scope of opportunity for exercising ‘substantive’ citizenship.82
Resettled refugees are not the only group in our society on the
outskirts of the polity, working towards substantive membership.
A growing number of impoverished families and individuals are excluded from meaningful participation in and protection by the
state.83 An assault on benefit programs has eliminated safety nets
for millions of poor people, and legislative enactments and associated judicial interpretations of them have precluded substantive legal protection for economic rights.84
Marginalized poor people in the United States could likely benefit from a two-way integration process that incorporates many of
the domains identified by Ager and Strang. A full exploration of
applying an integration model to incorporate poor people more securely within the polity is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that there is no international or domestic requirement to integrate poor people akin to the UNHCR’s integration
mandate for refugees. Consequently, even if an integration model
proved to empower impoverished Americans, programs would
likely be left to local community efforts, resembling this article’s proposal for community-based integration measures.
At least one scholar has criticized integration policies for refugees, suggesting that “integrationism” is “concerned with the adaptation by outsiders to local norms,” or facilitating conformity.85
Comments by refugees in Europe similarly reflect the concern that
integration really means complete assimilation. As one lamented,

Id. at 77.
See Nice, supra note 10, at 49–50 (asserting that the state has abandoned most
improverished families pursuant to the “war on welfare” led by U.S. policy makers).
84 See id. at 50, 57, 63–64.
85 McPherson, supra note 57, at 547, 551. Some criticism may be in response to
governmental policies that use the language of integration, but reflect an assimilationist approach by expecting refugees to adapt with no similar expectations on the
host society. See Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra note 58, at 528–29 (describing the UK’s “integration” policy as adopting a one-way assimilative stance).
82
83
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“[e]ven if we make every effort and try to be ‘integrated,’ we are
constantly reminded that to be properly and completely integrated,
we must give up our principles and our religion.”86
A related concern is the potential impact, if any, of a national
integration policy. Some analysts suggest that national models or
cultural norms of integration matter little outside of formalistic rules
of gaining citizenship, at least when considering the broader population of all immigrants.87 Moreover, an articulation of a national
integration policy cannot alter historically-rooted institutions and
dynamics that affect integration, such as patterns of racism, residential segregation, and educational inequality.88 Others, however,
maintain that the formal and social context of integration matters.
Governmental policies regarding immigration powerfully influence
understandings of citizenship and inclusion in the polity.89
Regardless of the contested nature of integration, UNHCR resettlement states “have an obligation to facilitate the integration of refugees in their countries.”90 The UNHCR indicates that resettlement
is not a “durable solution” unless it “offers refugees the support and
opportunities to facilitate their integration into their new community.”91

86 Lillie Dremeaux, ‘The Way People Look at Us Has Changed’: Muslim Women on
Life in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2016, at A6. But see Pfeffer supra note 54, at 49
(explaining the differences between integration and assimilation).
87 ALBA & FONER, supra note 60, at 229–31 (“How much national philosophies,
cultures, or models of integration matter for the actual integration of immigrants
and minorities is debatable.”).
88 Id. (alluding to the stratified structure of the educational system in Germany, and the “second-generation disadvantage” present in the American educational system, as examples of institutional obstacles to integration).
89 See BLOEMRAAD, supra note 55, at 4 (maintaining that immigration policies
influence immigrants’ understandings of citizenship); MOTOMURA, supra note 2, at
188 (commenting that “the role of race and ethnicity in U.S. immigration and citizenship law” results in many immigrants and their U.S. born descendants feeling
unwelcome and “less than fully American”); Aleinikoff & Rumbaut, supra note 2,
at 2 (hypothesizing that “the way people are invited or welcomed to become members of the society influences their joining behavior . . . .”).
90 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration of Resettled Refugees, supra note
7, at 6. Ruud Lubbers, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees at the time, stated
that the “UNHCR’s Agenda for Protection calls upon states to put in place policies
to ensure that resettlement runs in tandem with a vigorous integration policy.” Id.
91 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Resettlement Handbook, supra note 27, at 7.
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3.1.3. Integration in Canada
Many of the governments of UNHCR resettlement states have
adopted specific or overarching policies of refugee integration.92
Canada is among them. A primary goal of Canada’s 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act is to promote the successful integration of refugees and other immigrants.93 In addition, Canada’s
federal immigration and citizenship agency established a 2016-17
goal that “newcomers and citizens participate in fostering an integrated society.”94

92 See, e.g., SARAH SPENCER, THE MIGRATION OBSERVATORY, POLICY PRIMER:
INTEGRATION, 2 (2011) (highlighting the United Kingdom’s adoption of a “Refugee
Integration Strategy” in 2000).
93 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 § 3(1)(e) (Can.)
(stating the objective “to promote the successful integration of permanent residents
into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations for
new immigrants and Canadian society.”).
94 IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND CITIZENSHIP CANADA, REPORT ON PLANS AND
PRIORITIES 2016 -17. The European Union has also adopted integration standards
for all immigrants. See Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs
Press Release 14615/04 (Nov. 19, 2004), reaffirmed by Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs, Council Conclusions of the Council and the Representatives of the Member State on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals Legally Residing in the EU (June 5-6, 2014). German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s
Cabinet approved measures in May 2016 to help migrants become “good neighbors
and citizens.” Measures included “an understanding of and compliance with the
principles of living together in our society and compliance with our laws are essential for successful integration.” David Rising & Frank Jordans, German Officials OK
Plan for Migrant Influx, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, May 26, 2016, at A4.
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While direct comparisons are fraught with difficulty because of
different national histories, norms, and conditions, Canada’s experience with integration is notable.95 Many view Canada as a successful model of migrant integration.96 Since 1971, Canada has intentionally crafted an identity as a pluralistic, multi-cultural society.97
Canada’s official policy of multiculturalism reflects the ethos of
integration. It seeks to create a climate of mutual respect for different cultures nested within a cohesive Canadian identity.98 Integration of refugees and other immigrants is one of the initiatives in the

95 Some authors suggest that comparison of immigration policies and outcomes between the United States and Canada is appropriate. Both are considered
nations of immigrants. ALBA & FONER, supra note 60, at 223; BLOEMRAAD, supra note
55, at 8. Both are liberal welfare states. Id. Both share similar approaches to naturalization. Id. at 18-19. And, both adopted exclusionary immigration policies in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Id. at 8. Yet some suggest that
Canada’s selective immigration policies favoring skilled workers render comparison less relevant. ALBA & FONER, supra note 60, at 233. Others disagree, maintaining
that the impact of Canada’s system of evaluating a potential immigrant’s job skills,
language ability and other characteristics is exaggerated. BLOEMRAAD, supra note
55, at 41.
96 See ALBA & FONER, supra note 60, at 3 and 224 (noting that Canada is often
touted as a model of successful integration, but also that no country is completely
successful in every domain of integration).
97 See JONATHAN TEPPERMAN, THE FIX: HOW NATIONS SURVIVE AND THRIVE IN A
WORLD IN DECLINE 54-55 (2016) (describing the context of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s speech before parliament in which he announced Canada’s multiculturalism, and later created a new Ministry of Multiculturalism). The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, enacted in 1982, provides that the Charter “shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.” Constitution Act, 1982, Pt. I, s. 27 being Schedule
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app II, no 44 (Can.).
98 See John W. Berry & Feng Hou, Immigrant Acculturation and Wellbeing in Canada, 57 CAN. PSYCHOL. 254 (2016) (indicating that a goal of Canada’s multiculturalism is to accept that “individuals can be proud of and feel attached to both their
heritage cultures and to Canada.”); see also MICHAEL DEWING, LIBRARY OF
PARLIAMENT, PUBL’N NO. 2009-20-E, CANADIAN MULTICULTURALISM (2013),
https://bdp.parl.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2009-20-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75GY-TBVB] (detailing Canada’s institutionalization of multiculturalism as official federal policy).
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multiculturalism framework.99 This process, consistent with definitions of integration set forth earlier, “is a two-way street; an accommodation between newcomers and Canadians.”100
Rather than accentuating national security concerns, Canadians
view refugee and immigration policy as one of state building. As
Canada’s former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration stated,
“Why keep [migrants] as permanent tenants, when they could be
encouraged to become landlords of their adopted country?”101 Policy makers view integration as a way to prevent ethnic groups from
becoming marginalized and a potentially destabilizing element in
society.102
Federal and provincial governments support resident newcomers broadly, not just refugees.103 This support includes orientation
services about life in Canada (both overseas, for refugees and other
immigrants en route to Canada, and within Canada);104 language

99 See Marchi, supra note 6, at 24 (“In Canada, as a matter of public policy, the
federal government makes a focused and deliberate effort towards the integration
of newcomers”); see also Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra note 58, at 526
(stating that integration is the only means of acculturation that requires both host
and migrant adaptation).
100 Marchi, supra note 6, at 24.
101 Id. at 23. Marchi was not speaking solely of refugee integration, but of integrating all migrants.
102 See id. (noting that marginalization of immigrants undermines their contributions and can eventually lead to social inequalities with potentially destabilizing
effects).
103 Soojin Yu et al., Refugee Integration in Canada: A Survey of Empirical Evidence
and Existing Services, 24 REFUGE: CANADA’S J. ON REFUGEES 17, 23-25 (2007) (describing employment workshops, language training, and social support services that are
available to refugees and other immigrants but exclude applicants for asylum in
some areas).
104 The Canadian Orientation Abroad (“COA”) program is funded by Canada’s federal Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada and implemented by
the International Organization for Migration (“IOM”). COA claims that its threeday pre-arrival orientation program for resettled refugees “is the largest pre-arrival
orientation program presented by IOM, closely followed by the United States Cultural Orientation program.” About COA, CANADIAN ORIENTATION ABROAD,
[https://perma.cc/Q5PZ-Q73J]
http://www.coa-oce.ca/our-work/about-coa/
(last visited Feb. 11, 2017). One of the program’s objectives is to “[p]rovide information regarding rights and freedoms, responsibilities, and obligations as Permanent Residents.”
Canadian Orientation Abroad, GOV’T OF CAN.,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/partner/bpss/COA.asp
[https://perma.cc/9HWC-EKWR] (last modified Apr. 25, 2016). While COA does
not define “largest,” it operates training for refugees from seventeen permanent
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training in English and French; employment services; and community connections programs that help immigrants access services and
build networks with Canadians and established immigrants.105
Government-sponsored refugees receive up to one year of income
support for shelter, food, and incidentals.106 Canada also allows private groups and community organizations to sponsor refugees
through a program created in 1979.107 Privately-sponsored refugees
are entitled generally to one year of support from their sponsors.108
A large majority of foreign-born residents have acquired Canadian citizenship, unlike in the United States.109 While the data may

locations and serves over thirty countries with mobile trainers. The more decentralized U.S. cultural orientation program is offered only in nine Resettlement Support Centers globally and is staffed mostly by different nongovernmental organizations.
Who We Serve, CULTURAL ORIENTATION RESOURCE EXCHANGE,
http://coresourceexchange.org/about/who-we-serve/
[https://perma.cc/DKV4-CEXP] (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
105 See
How Canada’s Refugee System Works, GOV’T OF CAN.,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/canada.asp
[https://perma.cc/3ERT7X5L] (last modified Apr. 3, 2017) (addressing support for “all newcomers”); see also
Yu, et al., supra note 103, at 25 (describing federal and provincial support to connect
refugees with members of their host communities).
106 How Canada’s Refugee System Works, GOV’T OF CAN., supra note 105. Canada
utilizes two processes for admitting refugees from overseas. Government-assisted
refugees are referred by UNHCR and receive support from federal programs. Privately-sponsored refugees are supported by private, voluntary groups. Yu et al.,
supra note 103, at 18.
107 Canadian visa authorities determine the eligibility of refugees to enter the
country through this program, often in conjunction with UNHCR. Guide to the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, GOV’T OF CAN. 2.6, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/ref-sponsor/section-2.asp [https://perma.cc/LRQ5PC6P] (last modified May 17, 2017); see also Johanna Reynolds & Jennifer Hyndman,
A Turn in Canadian Refugee Policy and Practice, 16 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. 41,
44 (2015) (detailing recent changes and conditions of the Private Sponsorship Program). For an anecdotal review of Canada’s program of privately sponsoring refugees, see Jodi Kantor & Catrin Einhorn, Refugees Encounter a Foreign Word: Welcome,
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/world/americas/canada-syrian-refugees.html [https://perma.cc/XF3J-RFRY].
108 Guide to the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, GOV’T OF CAN., supra note
107.
109 See BLOEMRAAD, supra note 55, at 2–3 (reporting on a 2001 census that indicated that seventy-two percent of foreign-born residents had acquired Canadian
citizenship, almost double the proportion in the United States, and noting that the
proportion of foreign-born residents acquiring Canadian citizenship has increased
since the Canadian government began to pursue multiculturalism in the 1970’s).
Over twenty percent of Canada’s residents are foreign-born. Id. at 49.
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not be entirely comparable, it appears that refugees, specifically, naturalize at a higher rate in Canada compared to the rate of refugee
naturalization in the United States.110
Moreover, two thirds of Canadians view immigration as one of
Canada’s “key positive features.”111 In a comparison of Canadian
and U.S. immigrant integration, one author concludes that Canada’s
high levels of political incorporation of immigrants is due to the welcoming reception that host communities extend to newcomers,
shaped by the government’s multicultural policies and integration
measures112 Empirical research indicates that immigrant integration—in which newcomers retain a strong sense of belonging to
their heritage culture and to Canada—results in a greater level of
immigrant wellbeing.113
Refugees in Canada still struggle with the difficult process of integration.114 But many policy makers, citizens, and refugees suggest
110 Compare GARNETT PICOT & FENG HOU, STAT. CAN., 11F0019M NO. 338,
DIVERGENT TRENDS IN CITIZENSHIP RATES AMONG IMMIGRANTS IN CANADA AND THE
UNITED
STATES
(2011),
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11f0019m/11f0019m2011338-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MG3N-88DG] (highlighting that eighty-five percent of refugees
entering Canada in the early 1990s became citizens within six to ten years, though
it is not clear whether this figure includes only refugees resettled from outside of
Canada, or also those who entered Canada and successfully claimed asylum) with
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERV.’S, TRENDS IN NATURALIZATION RATES: FY 2014
UPDATE
(2016),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports/Trends-in-Naturalization-Rates-FY14Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/SB8Z-FBHC] (indicating that in the United States,
70.6 per cent of refugees admitted in 1994 and asylees who gained lawful permanent residency status that year became citizens by 2004); see also U.N. High Comm’r
for Refugees, Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, at 27 (2015),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-globaltrends-2015.html [https://perma.cc/LLJ5-R4QW] (reporting that, while data may
be incomplete, Canada reported the largest number of naturalized refugees in the
world in 2015, with about 25,900, or eighty-one percent, of all naturalized refugees
worldwide).
111 TEPPERMAN, supra note 97, at 49. A 2006 national poll of Canadians revealed
that multiculturalism policies were more important to Canadian identity than
hockey. Id. at 63.
112 See BLOEMRAAD, supra note 55, at 102-03, 31–64 (addressing and discounting
other variables, including immigrants’ attributes, country of origin, and relative
size of immigrant streams, among others).
113 Berry & Hou, supra note 98, at 260.
114 See, e.g., Nimo Bokore, Documenting Refugee Stories: Resettlement and Integration Challenges of East African Refugees, 3 INT’L J. OF SOC. WORK 76, 82 (addressing
difficulties faced by resettled refugees in Canada, including ethnic, religious, and
racial discrimination); Yu et al., supra note 103, at 24 (reporting that the amount of
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that material and symbolic government support for integration has
helped to construct a pluralistic, productive, and secure polity.115
This, however, is not the path chosen by the U.S. government.
3.2. USRAP Policy, Practice, and Flaws
As a signatory of the U.N. Refugee Convention, the United
States is obligated to cooperate with the UNHCR. The UNHCR requires states receiving resettled refugees to provide the support and
opportunities necessary for refugees to integrate into their new communities.116 Nonetheless, the U.S. refugee resettlement program
falls substantially short of facilitating long-term integration.
U.S. policy is not definitively set forth in any single statement or
document.117 The lack of clarity is likely related to the fact that different parts of the U.S. refugee admissions and resettlement program are managed by different federal departments. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) oversees the process of vetting
applicants within the United States for asylum, and those outside of
U.S. borders seeking entry as refugees.118 The Department of State

cash assistance provided to government assisted refugees during their first year
does not always cover all expenses); Kantor & Einhorn, supra note 107 (identifying
the cultural difficulties that resettled refugees face in Canada).
115 See BLOEMRAAD, supra note 55, at 9–10 (arguing that Canada’s policies lead
to “a greater sense of political citizenship” on the part of immigrants); see also
TEPPERMAN, supra note 97, at 61, 67 (describing the transformation of Canada from
a “small, closed, ethnically homogenous state into a vibrant global powerhouse and
one of the most open and successful multicultural nations in the world.”).
116 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration of Resettled Refugees, supra note
7, at 6.
117 NEZER, supra note 8, at 14 (“The U.S. is the only major resettlement country
in the world that does not have federal integration benchmarks.”).
118 Screening oversees refugees referred for resettlement also involves the State
Department. The State Department contracts with “overseas processing entities”
to collect biographic information. Kerwin, supra note 41, at 6. The U.S. Customs
and Immigration Service, a subdivision within the DHS reviews this information,
“coordinates background checks . . . , interviews applicants, and determines eligibility and admissibility.” Id. In addition, DHS works with the State Department to
screen refugee applicants outside of the United States. U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/index.htm [https://perma.cc/6UJ3-6L2W].
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(“State Department”) manages the placement and reception of people overseas admitted to the United States as refugees.119 The Department of Health and Human Services provides limited cash,
medical, and other assistance to refugees newly resettled in the
United States.120 In addition, the assistance provided to refugees
once they arrive in the United States is decentralized, with much of
the responsibility in the hands of voluntary resettlement agencies
located throughout the country.121 These agencies use funds allocated from the State Department to provide limited support for at
least the first thirty days after a resettled refugee arrives in the
United States.122 Agency volunteers or staff typically meet resettled
refugees at the airport and take them to pre-arranged housing.123
Agency case managers work to help address the most basic needs of
refugees directly after arrival.
Of the various offices within the three federal agencies tasked
with working with refugees either bound for or within the United
States, only one includes a mission statement that mentions integration. The Office of Refugee Resettlement, located within the Department of Health and Human Services, states that its mission is to provide “people in need with critical resources to assist them in

119 The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (“PRM”), organized
within the State Department, helps to collect and evaluate applications for refugee
status from outside of the United States and operates the Reception and Placement
Program. U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, supra note 118.
120 The Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement works through state governments and nongovernmental organizations to
provide cash and medical assistance, as well as language, employment, and social
Refugees, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.’S,
services.
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/refugees [https://perma.cc/N2AB-RDF7] (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
121 The State Department’s Reception and Placement program works with nine
nongovernmental domestic resettlement agencies to place refugees in about 190
communities throughout the United States and provides refugees with support
during their first one to three months. The Reception and Placement Program, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/index.htm [https://perma.cc/9HKD-QVVL] (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
122 The program provides funding to agencies on a per capita basis that is used
towards meeting the refugees’ immediate needs on arrival. Id.
123 NEZER, supra note 8, at 6 (detailing the activities and services conducted by
voluntary agencies, known as “volags,” to aid incoming refugees).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss1/5

2017]

Refugees, Rights, and Responsibilities

217

becoming integrated members of American society.”124 Beyond this
brief mention, there is no definition of what it means to be an integrated member of American society, and there are neither any strategies provided to achieve integration nor indicators given to measure integration.125
The text of the 1980 Refugee Act does not expressly identify any
specific policy guiding refugee resettlement efforts. In enacting the
1980 Refugee Act, Congress was more concerned with replacing the
prior ad hoc entrance procedure with a comprehensive structure for
the overseas admission of refugees into the United States.126 The legal framework of the Act establishes programs to enhance the economic self-sufficiency of refugees. Rather than constructing a policy, the Refugee Act calls for the President to appoint a Coordinator
for Refugee Affairs, who is tasked with developing an “overall
United States refugee admission and resettlement policy.”127 The
legislation charges the Coordinator, an Ambassador-at-Large, with
coordinating U.S. domestic and international refugee admission and
resettlement programs.128 There apparently has not been an Ambassador-at-Large serving as Coordinator for Refugee Affairs since February 1993.129

124 What
We Do, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.’S,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/about/what-we-do
[https://perma.cc/C6PTVQUK] (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
125 The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) formed an “Integration Working
Group” in June 2006 to analyze refugee integration. A consultant tasked with facilitating the working group issued a report January 2007 with a working definition
of integration, integration indicators, and best practices related to these indicators.
INST. FOR SOC. AND ECON. DEV., REPORT OF THE INTEGRATION WORKING GROUP (2007),
http://ised-sow3.org.s56263.gridserver.com/sites/default/files/Report%20of%20the%20IWG.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZSD6-EWLU].
126 Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative
History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 11 (1981–82).
127 1980 Refugee Act, PUB. L. NO. 96–212, § 301(b)(1), 94 Stat. 102.
128 Id. § 301(b)(2).
129 U.S.
Ambassador
at
Large,
NNDB,
http://www.nndb.com/gov/539/000121176/ [https://perma.cc/8QTD-RQ83]
(last visited Feb. 20, 2017) (indicating that Jewel S. Lafontant, who ended her term
in Februrary of 1993, was the last Coordinator for Refugee Affairs). Currently, the
PRM Director is also Deputy Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. OFFICE OF THE
HISTORIAN, Assistant Secretaries of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration Affairs,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/principalofficers/assistant-secretary-for-population-refugees-migration
[https://perma.cc/X5WJ-X72P] (last visited Feb. 20, 2017).
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As a 1983 Government Accounting Office report concluded:
[i]mplementation of the [1980 Refugee Act’s] legislative
mandate requiring the Coordinator to develop an overall
U.S. refugee admission and resettlement policy has proved
to be extremely difficult and controversial. Overall, interpretation of policymaking responsibilities remains an issue of
contention between the Coordinator’s Office and the Federal
agencies charged with program implementation. Also, the
Office lacks the authority and resources to implement or enforce policy.130
If there is a singular objective that drives U.S. refugee resettlement, it could be summarized as rapid economic self-sufficiency.
While not enunciated as a policy framework, the goal to situate refugees in the workplace as soon as possible seems to drive U.S. resettlement efforts. This is evident in legislation, as well as Executive
Branch strategy.131
The 1980 Refugee Act emphasizes speedy economic self-sufficiency.132 The section on assistance to refugees begins with calling
for “sufficient resources for employment training and placement in
order to achieve economic self-sufficiency among refugees as
quickly as possible.”133 Federal regulations define economic self-

130 Samuel W. Bowlin, Assoc. Dir., Nat’l Sec. and Int’l Affairs Div., Role of the
U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law House Judiciary Committee (June 22,
1983).
131 See Harris, supra note 43, at 41, 83–84 (discussing the 1980 Refugee Act’s
focus on rapid job acquisition and “effective resettlement”); see also Paul Kenny &
Kate Lockwood-Kenny, A Mixed Blessing: Karen Resettlement to the United States, 24
J. REFUGEE STUD. 217, 225 (2011) (noting that “[s]elf-sufficiency has always been the
cornerstone of the US resettlement policy”); Kerwin, supra note 41, at 10 (stating
that “early self-sufficiency through employment represents a core programme
goal.”).
132 The Act initially, and as amended, also addresses opportunities for English
language training “in nonwork hours where possible.” Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2017). The Act also authorizes medical assistance, if such assistance will encourage economic self-sufficiency or avoid significant burdens on a state. Id. § 1522(e)(5)(A).
133 1980 Refugee Act, supra note 127, § 1522(a)(1)(A); Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note 132, § 1522(a)(1)(A) (2017).
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sufficiency as earnings sufficient to support a family without receiving cash assistance.134
In addition, the arm of the State Department tasked with refugee
resettlement emphasizes work, encouraging employment as soon as
possible.135 The Department of Health and Human Services, Office
of Refugee Resettlement stresses the importance of work as well.136
Local refugee resettlement agencies help to carry out the rapid employment mandate by assisting newly-arrived refugees with enrolling in employment services.137 Even the English-language classes
to which state agencies refer refugees concentrate instruction on vocabulary for particular, low-skill jobs.138
The prioritization of rapid employment assumes that participation in the labor force as quickly as possible is the best way for refu-

134 45 C.F.R. § 400.2 (2017) (defining cash assistance as: “financial assistance to
refugees, including TANF, SSI, refugee cash assistance, and general assistance, as
defined herein, under title IV of the Act.”).
135 The Reception and Placement Program within the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration states: “Refugees receive employment
authorization upon arrival and are encouraged to become employed as soon as possible. Based on years of experience, the U.S. refugee resettlement program has
found that people learn English and begin to function comfortably much faster if
they start work soon after arrival. Most refugees begin in entry-level jobs, even if
they have high-level skills or education. With time, many if not most refugees move
ahead professionally and find both success and satisfaction in the United States.”
OF
STATE,
Reception
and
Placement
Program,
U.S.
DEP’T
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/X2GN-2UX6] (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
136 The Office of Refugee Resettlement’s Division of Refugee Assistance’s mission statement indicates that “DRA [Division of Refugee Assistance] provides direction to States to ensure that refugees are provided assistance and services
through State-administered programs that enable them to become employed and
economically self-sufficient as soon as possible after their arrival in the United
States.” Divisions – Refugee Assistance, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.’S (Oct.
3, 2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/divisions-refugee-assistance
[https://perma.cc/8RLD-ASAP].
137 See, e.g., WORLD RELIEF SPOKANE, https://worldreliefspokane.org/refugeeresettlement [https://perma.cc/44AU-CUA8] (last visited Jan. 18, 2017) (stating
that staff and volunteers assist refugees with enrolling in employment services).
138 See, e.g., WASH. STATE DEP’T OF SOCIAL & HEALTH SERV.’S, REPORT TO THE
LEGISLATURE: REFUGEE AND IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT SERVICES: LIMITED ENGLISH
PROFICIENT (LEP) PATHWAY AND BASIC FOOD EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING (BFET), 4,
10 (2015) (stating that “LEP Pathway’s ESL services provide participants with
work-related English language training to enhance their employability” and indicating that refugees receiving TANF or Refugee Cash Assistance are referred to this
program).
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gees to successfully resettle in the United States. Through work, refugees are said to improve English language skills, gain familiarity
with U.S. customs, and enhance economic self-sufficiency.139
This focus on speedy economic self-sufficiency through employment is consistent with a market-based approach to social welfare.
The United States has long opted to privatize many social benefits
by transferring responsibility for basic social welfare to employers.140 In the 1980s, neoliberal champions of fiscal austerity and free
markets reformed or eliminated governmental social welfare programs based on the assumption that markets would maximize social
well-being.141 The Refugee Act, adopted as neoliberalism began to
take root among U.S. policy makers, followed suit by authorizing
minimal governmental support for refugees and steering newcomers into the labor market as soon as possible.142
A market-based system of social welfare conveys the misleading
message that if a person invests labor in the market economy, society will provide the broader conditions for prosperity and dignity.143

139 See Bill Ong Hing, Providing a Second Chance, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1893, 1898
(2007) (quoting a 1993 vision statement from the director of the Office of Refugee
Resettlement that touts the benefits of rapid employment).
140 Maria L. Ontiveros, The Myths of Market Forces, Mothers, and Private Employment: The Parental Leave Veto, 1 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 49 (1992) (stating that
“our society has chosen the workplace to deliver social welfare benefits.”).
141 See Mimi Abramovitz, Neither Accidental, Nor Simply Mean-Spirited: The Context for Welfare Reform, in THE PROMISE OF WELFARE REFORM: POLITICAL RHETORIC AND
THE REALITY OF POVERTY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, 23, 26–27 (Keith M. Kilty &
Elizabeth A. Segal, eds., 2006) (discussing the rise of neoliberalism and its tenets);
see also Mitchell Dean, Rethinking Neoliberalism, 50 J. OF SOC. 150, 157 (2012) (noting
the prominence of neoliberalism beginning in the late 1970s).
142 In this regard, refugees join impoverished Americans pushed into the low
wage labor market as a supposed panacea. Welfare benefits have consistently been
low enough to impose a work requirement for survival, but the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act imposed a strict work requirement, sanctioning individuals and states that failed to comply. Nice, supra
note 10, at 63–64.
143 See LAUREN BERLANT, THE QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO WASHINGTON CITY:
ESSAYS ON SEX AND CITIZENSHIP 4 (1997) (noting “the fantasy of the American
Dream” that “promises that if you invest your energies in work and family-making,
the nation will secure the broader social and economic conditions in which your
labor can gain value and your life can be lived with dignity.”); Laura R. Peck &
Sarah Allen Gershon, Welfare Reform and the American Dream, in THE PROMISE OF
WELFARE REFORM, supra note 141, at 97 (noting that the American Dream, which
promises “success in exchange for hard work and honesty,” regardless of its merits,
shapes public attitudes toward the poor).
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For refugees, and likely other disadvantaged groups, the opposite
may be true: these broader conditions may be a prerequisite for productive participation in the labor market. For example, the UNHCR
stated in a 2016 report on refugee integration that “[s]elf-reliance
can, however, only be achieved if there is an enabling environment.
This includes a viable economic situation, the availability of affordable housing, as well as receptive attitudes within the host community.”144
Even if neoliberal assumptions held true in the 1980s, the nature
of the economy and jobs has since changed dramatically. The number of contingent workers has expanded significantly, resulting in
less pay and leaving these workers without Social Security contributions, unemployment insurance, or workers’ compensation.145 Even
prior advocates of neoliberal economic philosophy have concluded
since the financial crisis of 2008 that austerity and market-oriented
policies have exacerbated economic inequality.146 Despite recent
discrediting of neoliberalism in general, and longstanding criticism
that the U.S. refugee resettlement program has lacked proper funding and coordination, change appears unlikely.147
144 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration - A Fundamental Component, supra note 66, at 2.
145 See
Contingent
Workers,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/reich/reports/dunlop/section5.htm [https://perma.cc/3D9K-MG6S] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
146 Rick Rowden, The IMF Confronts Its N-Word: The International Monetary Fund
Admits that it’s Time to Discard Some of the Old Neoliberal Dogmas, FOREIGN POLICY
(July 6, 2016, 3:22 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/06/the-imf-confrontsits-n-word-neoliberalism/ [https://perma.cc/58K7-TSRN] (discussing the International Monetary Fund’s acknowledgement that the organization had historically
oversold the benefits of fiscal austerity and noting that this acknowledgment reflects a reckoning with “the failure of 30 years of neoliberal policies to bring about
financial stability or lessen widening economic divides.”).
147 There was some indication in 2015 that federal agencies were ready to expand beyond a limited economic self-sufficiency objective. A White House task
force on “New Americans” published in April 2015 a “strategic action plan on immigrant and refugee integration.” THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON NEW
AMERICANS, STRENGTHENING COMMUNITIES BY WELCOMING ALL RESIDENTS: A
FEDERAL STRATEGIC ACTION PLAN ON IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE INTEGRATION (2015)
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/final_tf_newamericans_report_4-14-15_clean.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL24-PHN4].
This interdepartmental task force included representation from the agencies involved in USRAP, as well as other federal agencies and offices. The plan identified
five goals to strengthen the “integration pillars” of civic, economic, and linguistic
integration. Even prior to the election of President Trump, it was not clear that the
recommendations of the task force would have resulted in a policy of integration
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Concern with employment and economic self-sufficiency is
practical. Employment is indeed correlated with more positive outcomes for refugees.148 Ager and Strang identify employment as an
element of integration, indicating that work is a factor in promoting
economic independence, planning for the future, building social ties
within the host society, developing language skills, restoring selfesteem, and encouraging self-reliance.149 Refugees themselves want
opportunities to contribute their skills and efforts in their new communities and the ability to support themselves and their families.150

for refugees with strategies beyond economic self-sufficiency. Many of the plan’s
strategies were geared towards employment. Moreover, the task force paid little
attention to what some observers deem to be crucial differences between immigrants and refugees: immigrants voluntarily leave their home; refugees do not. See
Catherine Dauvergne, Informing Integration: Assessing What We Know, Admitting
What We Don’t Know, 24 REFUGE: CAN.’S J. ON REFUGEES 14, 14–15 (2007) (pointing
out distinctions in Canada between refugees and immigrants, arguing that it is
shortsighted to expect the two groups to integrate in the same way, and highlighting concern with integration measures that merge immigrant and refugee integration). Accordingly, the task force did not address some of the integration domains
that Ager and Strang identify for refugee integration, such as health, safety, and
stability.
148 See Kim, supra note 62, at 750–51 (noting that compared with employed refugees, refugees who were outside of the labor force had higher odds of being diagnosed with mood disorders); see also Rihab Mousa Yako & Bipasha Biswas, “We
Came To This Country for the Future of Our Children. We Have No Future”: Acculturative Stress Among Iraqi Refugees in the United States, 38 INT’L J. OF INTERCULTURAL REL.
133, 134 (2014) (concluding that unemployment increases stress, negatively impacting refugees’ health).
149 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 170. See also FIX ET AL., supra note 2, at 2, 13,
17 (reporting that refugee employment rates are equal to or higher than those of
U.S. born adults but also noting lower incomes for refugee households than those
of U.S. born households).
150 See, e.g., GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., supra note 63, at 21 (recounting an
Iraqi refugee couple, a physician and a veterinarian, unable to find jobs, but wanting to work, even at entry-level minimum wage jobs); Kenny & Lockwood-Kenny,
supra note 131, at 228 (reporting on interviews with Karen refugees awaiting resettlement as wanting to work, so that “they would be able to progress,” and quoting
one as stating “I am looking forward to going to America because there will be good
opportunities for us if we work hard.”); Christopher R. Lester, Jr., Refugee Education and Economic Integration: A Qualitative Study of the United States Refugee
Admissions Program 3 (May 28, 2014) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Central European
University),
http://www.etd.ceu.hu/2014/lester_christopher.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2S34-K5H6] (reporting that many refugees look forward to obtaining work and providing for their families).
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While employment plays a role in integration, the multidimensional integration process stretches well beyond speedy and minimal economic self-sufficiency.151 Rapid employment may not enhance the long-term economic independence considered part of an
integration policy.152 In fact, it may impair successful integration.
This is true for at least five reasons.
First, a rapid employment strategy fails to address barriers to
long-term economic independence.153 Some refugees are more
highly educated than other groups of immigrants.154 But refugees
with skills, expertise or professional education find that their quali-

151 See Harris, supra note 43, at 43 (asserting that “integration is much more
than ‘economic self-sufficiency’”). A UNHCR definition of integration indicates
that “self-reliance is but one part” of an integration process. U.N. High Comm’r for
Refugees, Integration – A Fundamental Component, supra note 66, at 1. A UNHCR
research report states that integration is a process related to, “but also to be distinguished from, self reliance.” Rosa da Costa, U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Rights
of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations, at 8,
U.N. Doc. POLAS/2006/02 (June 2006), http://www.unhcr.org/44bb90882.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H5Z8-QQL5]. In addition, the UNHCR asserts that “[i]ntegrating refugees goes beyond ensuring that they are provided with basic needs and
access to services.” U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration of Resettled Refugees,
supra note 7, at 8.
152 See Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 170–71 (discussing the domain of “employment,” including the problem of underemployment because of work that is
mismatched with a refugee’s skills and the need for vocational training education
to foster employability). Rather than representing a path to prosperity, a narrow
focus on economic self-sufficiency through rapid employment “undermines long
term integration and resettlement success” for refugees. Harris, supra, note 43, at
82.
153 See Liz Alderman, Guiding Refugees in Europe on a Rocky Path to Assimilation,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2016 (reporting on barriers to employment faced by refugees in
Europe and private initiatives to help clear those barriers). See also Harris, supra
note 43, at 58.
154 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 170.
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fications are not transferable, or require a lengthy and costly recertification or recredentialing process.155 Accordingly, they take “survival jobs” that hinder prospects for long-term economic stability.156
In addition, the narrow rapid employment objective neglects the impact that housing has on the ability to secure employment. The
housing that resettlement agencies select for refugees is often located in dangerous areas, far from work opportunities.157 Moreover,

155 See Harris, supra note 43, at 55–59. Ives, supra note 53, at 58–59. Rebecca
Joie Habeeb-Silva, Resettlement Challenges for Refugees in the United States 31–32
(June 2016) (unpublished M.S.W. thesis, California State University, San Bernardino), http://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1321&context=etd [https://perma.cc/MS7L-2RVD] (recounting from interviews with an
Iraqi refugee family frustration at the inability to transfer college degrees or credit
from completed college courses. Quoting also an Afghan refugee who had worked
with USAID in Afghanistan, with over 13 years of management experience and geographical information mapping skills, unable to secure employment in his field
and instead worked as a security guard).
156 COLUMBIA UNIV. SCH. OF INT’L & PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 63, at 11 (noting
that the need to secure a speedy job that often does not match a refugee’s skill set
can prevent refugees from having time to become acclimated and access supportive
services that could improve long-term outcomes). See FIX ET AL., supra note 2, at 16
(commenting on data suggesting high levels of underemployment among refugees
with college degrees); see also Harris, supra note 43, at 29 (coining the term “survival
jobs”); GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., supra note 63, at 25 (indicating that the emphasis on immediate employment incentivizes resettlement agency caseworkers to
push Iraqi refugees into low-paying jobs, regardless of the refugee’s professional
and educational experience). Refugees report high levels of stress related to debts
that accrue immediately after arrival, including repaying the travel loan extended
to them by the International Organization for Migration that paid their transportation cost to the United States. Habeeb-Silva, supra note 155, at 35. See Agbényiga
et al., supra note 48, at 317 (recounting interviews with Burundian refugees struggling to secure adequate housing and food); Yako & Biswas, supra note 148, at 138
(reporting that some Iraqi refugees arrived already carrying debt after expending
all of their resources waiting in a country of first asylum for resettlement).
157 See Hing, supra note 139, at 1897 (noting that “[r]esettlement efforts have led
to tough inner-city living environments for many, where they are surrounded by
urban crime and gang activity.”); see also, Agbényiga et al., supra note 48, at 316
(citing refugee concerns with housing located in dangerous neighborhoods);
COLUMBIA UNIV. SCH. OF INT’L & PUB. AFFAIRS, supra note 63, at 12 (identifying the
lack of public transportation options for many refugees from homes to job interviews and subsequent employment); GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., supra note 63,
at 23 (quoting refugees who had missed job opportunities for lack of transportation
to interviews); Kim, supra note 62, at 741 (finding that “[m]ost refugees of color are
placed in urban areas with high poverty and poverty-related problems, and high
rates of violence in the neighborhoods.”); Kenny & Lockwood-Kenny, supra note
131, at 13 (reporting on the resettlement agency’s location of Karen refugees in one
of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the city). Refugees’ concerns regarding
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the trauma and violence many refugees have experienced can lead
to mental and physical health problems that, left untreated, can impair a person’s ability to work.158
Second, securing employment quickly may undermine the integration domain incorporating language and cultural knowledge.
Weak English-language facility can prevent a refugee from attaining
a job that matches his or her skills or abilities.159 Yet refugees receiving temporary state or federal assistance may be required to take one
or more low-paying jobs as a condition of such assistance, often preventing their attendance at ESL classes because of long hours and
extensive commutes.160 Without sufficient English-language skills,

the safety and location of housing echo longstanding concerns of poor people in
general and the substandard housing to which they are relegated.
158 Harris, supra note 43, at 58, n.101. Federal Refugee Medical Assistance expires eight months after arrival in the United States. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERV.’S, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ORR INDICATORS FOR REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT STAKEHOLDERS 21 (2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/orr/508_compliant_fy_2016_orr_indicators_for_refugee_resettlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBC6-NCSE]. Thereafter, refugees who meet income
criteria are eligible for Medicaid under the Affordable Healthcare Act. Id. Access
to healthcare and clinical resources for refugees varies among states. Refugee Health,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.’S, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/programs/refugee-health [https://perma.cc/N2AB-RDF7] (last visited Oct. 6, 2017).
Culturally appropriate mental health care is scarce. See CONTINUITY OF RISK, supra
note 62, at 23 (identifying a lack of “culturally and linguistically appropriate and
affordable mental health services as a critical, unmet need” in a study of Congolese
refugee women); Kenny & Lockwood-Kenny, supra note 131, at 9 (noting that the
requirement to find a job soon after arrival does not give refugees time to recover
from any traumas they have experienced).
159 Ives, supra note 53, at 58 (reporting on results of a study of Bosnian refugees
resettled in the United States and concluding that they lacked access to intensive
English language programs that could “enable them to move from manual labor . . .
to better paying jobs more in line with their skill sets obtained in Bosnia.”).
160 See Harris, supra note 43, at 34, 61; see also Ives supra note 53, at 60 (reporting
that refugees are essentially trapped in low-wage jobs “because of either no involvement in English courses due to immediate job obligations or involvement in
courses that are geared toward minimum-wage work.”); Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note 132, § 1522 (e)(2)(A) (2017) (conditioning temporary cash assistance to refugees on a refugee’s registration with an employment service agency
and acceptance of “appropriate offers of employment.”). See, e.g., Habeeb-Silva,
supra note 155, at 36–67 (quoting an Iraqi refugee father lamenting that his sons
became ineligible for assistance when they enrolled in community college rather
than working).
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refugees cannot advance beyond the low-paying jobs that initially
interrupted their ESL classes.161
Third, immediate participation in the labor force can interfere
with building the social bonds and social bridges that play a significant role in refugee health and feelings of being settled.162 Long
hours devoted to work soon after arrival prevent establishing social
connections.163 As the UNHCR has concluded, “the time-limited focus on employment and self-sufficiency appears to overshadow the
benefits of meaningful interpersonal interactions that include strong
social and emotional support.”164
Fourth, the economic self-sufficiency emphasis fails to consider
the host community into which refugees are resettled—the other
side of the integration equation. As integration definitions indicate,
a host community and its institutions should be willing to meet the
needs of a diverse population. With limited federal resources directed primarily at securing jobs for refugees, there is little or no assistance for facilitating interaction between refugees and their new
communities. Communities that have received a proportionately

161 See CONTINUITY OF RISK, supra note 62, at 30 (discussing that the Congolese
women refugees interviewed “reported ceasing to attend ESL classes as soon as
they started working, which, for some, was as early as 6 weeks post-arrival in the
US. Women cited a lack of evening ESL classes and difficulties with transportation,
as well as not having enough energy or time, as their primary reasons for dropping
out of ESL classes.”); see also FIX ET AL., supra note 2 at 15 (noting that a large percentage of adult refugees are unable to speak English well even after years of residence, despite also concluding that half of refugees are employed within eight
months of arrival).
162 See Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 178, 180 (addressing the import and
benefits of social connections); see also Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra
note 58, and accompanying text (describing the positive impact of social connections on refugees). See, e.g., CONTINUITY OF RISK, supra note 62, at 26, 31 (addressing
the isolation that Congolese women refugees reported and citing the barriers of
work schedules and demands and concluding that Congolese women refugees with
children needed more time and support before they could be expected to be selfsufficient).
163 See Sungkyu Lee et al., Community Integration of Burmese Refugees in the
United States, 6 ASIAN AM. J. OF PSYCHOL. 333, 338 (2015) (finding that long work
hours may inhibit community integration).
164 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Integration – A Fundamental Component,
supra note 66, at 3 (referring to a UNHCR-supported research report, The Continuity of Risk: A Three-City Study of Congolese Women-at-Risk Resettled in the U.S.);
see also Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra note 58, at 540 (concluding that
social connections helped “facilitate access to the wide range of support that refugees needed to move their lives forward”).
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large number of refugees, without sufficient federal support, are increasingly resistant to refugee resettlement and likely disinclined to
build bridges with an unwanted community.165
Finally, on a more abstract level, stressing economic self-sufficiency through rapid employment does refugees and host societies
a disservice by perpetuating a narrative of refugees as welfare dependents.166 Indeed, consistent with neoliberal philosophy, the
amended Refugee Act specifically instructs local resettlement agencies to adopt criteria “to reduce welfare dependency among refugees resettled by that agency.”167 The pervasive characterization of
resettled refugees as “the ‘needy’ other”168 not only marginalizes refugees but also prevents resettlement communities from capitalizing
on the potential economic, social, and cultural contributions that refugees can offer.169

165 See NEZER, supra note 8, at 10–13 (reporting on local resistance to refugee
resettlement); ABANDONED UPON ARRIVAL, supra note 8, at 2–3 (suggesting that low
levels of federal assistance harm resettlement communities as well as refugees).
States have expressed concern about accepting refugees in light of limited federal
funds. FIX ET AL., supra note 2 at 19 (reporting that in 2016, four states announced
an intent to withdraw from the state-administered part of the federal refugee resettlement program).
166 This narrative has permeated U.S. immigration laws since their inception.
See MOTOMURA, supra note 2, at 47 (recounting federal immigration laws since 1883
excluding immigrants likely to become public charges, and referring to state exclusions prior to the rise of federal law); see also FIX ET AL., supra note 2, at 20 (concluding that “perceptions of slow refugee integration, high benefit use rates, and low
employment levels have not, in general, been supported by the evidence” from a
study of five refugee nationalities in four states).
167 Immigration & Nationality Act, supra note 132, § 1522(b)(8)(A) (2017). See
also id. § 1522(a)(2)(C)(iii)(III) (cautioning that assistance to refugees should not promote long-term dependence on public assistance).
168 See Tyeklar, supra note 44, at 153, 162 (noting that U.S. resettlement agencies
commonly represent refugees as “the ‘needy’ other.”).
169 Harris, supra, note 43, at 43. For example, roughly forty-five percent of Fortune 500 companies were established by immigrants or their children. PARTNERSHIP
FOR A NEW AMERICAN ECONOMY, THE “NEW AMERICAN” FORTUNE 500 11 (June 2011),
http://www.renewoureconomy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/new-american-fortune-500-june-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRC6-YA9G]. While this study
includes voluntary immigrants as well as refugees, it speaks to the human capital
that might be squandered by a focus on rapid employment for refugees. See, e.g.,
Anastasia Brown & Todd Scribner, Unfulfilled Promises, Future Possibilities: The Refugee Resettlement System in the United States, 2 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SECURITY 101,
110 (2014) (noting that refugees substantially contribute to local communities and
citing a study finding that refugees contributed $48 million to the economy in
Cleveland, Ohio); GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, supra note 63, at 26 (con-
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3.3. Bridging the Gap
A federal policy excluding refugees, with no mechanism in place
to facilitate the integration of refugees already present in the United
States, will not likely improve domestic security. President Trump’s
ban on refugees and other immigrants has fueled xenophobic and
racist narratives and may have played a role in violent attacks
against immigrants.170 Research has demonstrated that the climate
of reception influences how immigrants and their children behave.171 The current environment of hostility and intolerance may
only serve to promote ethnic separatism that could weaken community safety.172
cluding that “modeling refugee assistance on anti-poverty programs is misguided”); Brown & Scribner, supra note 169, at 108–09 (asserting that associating
refugee assistance with a form of welfare has altered how segments of the American
public perceive resettled refugees).
170 See Janice Williams, Under Trump Anti-Muslim Hate Crimes Have Increased at
(July
17,
2017,
6:05
PM),
an
Alarming
Rate,
NEWSWEEK
http://www.newsweek.com/hate-crime-america-muslims-trump-638000
[https://perma.cc/5VS7-EURH] (recounting a 91% increase in reported hatecrimes against Muslims in the first half of 2017 compared to the same period in
2016, with many said to be triggered by the victim’s national origin). See, e.g., Sandi
Doughton, FBI Aids in Investigation into Shooting of Sikh Man in Kent, SEATTLE TIMES
(Mar. 5, 2017, 12:11 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/fbiaids-in-investigation-into-shooting-of-sikh-man-in-kent/
[https://perma.cc/GAD8-5CRB] (reporting that the victim of a shooting, a U.S. citizen originally from India, claimed his assailant told him to “go back to your own
country”); Liam Stack, F.B.I. Investigating Kansas Shooting of Indian Men as Hate
TIMES
(Feb.
28,
2017),
https://www.nyCrime,
N.Y.
times.com/2017/02/28/us/kansas-shooting-indians-fbi.html
[https://perma.cc/AVR6-HFTB] (indicating that the F.B.I. is investigating as a hate
crime the shooting of two Indian immigrants by a white assailant who questioned
their immigration status and issued ethnic slurs before firing shots); see also Türk,
supra note 5, at 4 (noting “a proliferation of xenophobic narratives” in some countries that has led to attacks against refugees).
171 See BLOEMRAAD, supra note 55, at 2 (arguing that “differences in the context
of reception [of immigrants] produce quantifiable differences in political incorporation”). See also Aleinikoff & Rumbaut, supra note 2, at 20 (presenting survey data
showing that groups that have found a favorable degree of reception in the United
States were more likely to have a positive view about life in America while groups
that are subject to racism and intolerance in the United States were less confident
that they could ever gain acceptance).
172 See Aleinikoff & Rumbaut, supra note 2, at 2, 19–20 (arguing that “the way
people are invited or welcomed to become members of the society influences their
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In the absence of a federal integration policy or strategy, local
actors can facilitate the integration of resettled refugees and help
counterbalance national pronouncements of exclusion. The experiences of resettled refugees around the world underscore the value
of even small efforts in the integration process. In describing the
import of social connections with members of a host community,
Ager and Strang suggest that “[s]mall acts of friendship appeared to
have a disproportionately positive impact on perceptions. Friendliness from the settled community was very important in helping refugees feel more secure and persuading them that their presence was
not resented.”173
An evaluation of refugee integration projects in the United Kingdom suggests that social connections promote integration, even in
the absence of a robust state policy or support for a two-way integration process. Projects that have facilitated such connections have
helped reduce isolation, lower levels of depression, and increase
motivation among refugees.174 Notably, both refugees and members
of host communities reported feeling safer following participation
in projects that encouraged social interaction between the two
groups.175
Similarly, providing refugees with information on the laws and
administration of justice in their new home through a communitybased forum can promote integration.176 As indicated at the beginning of Section 3, such programs can strengthen the citizenship and
joining behavior” and adding that this conditioned behavior “influences how society invites others to join it.”).
173 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 180. Along a similar vein, a Government
Accountability Office report to the U.S. Senate that was critical of the refugee resettlement program recommended federal funding to enhance community engagement to increase public awareness of and interaction with refugees. ABANDONED
UPON ARRIVAL, supra note 8, at 6.
174 Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra note 58, at 536–37. Others underscore the primacy of social connections. See, e.g., BLOEMRAAD, supra note 55, at 66
(maintaining that immigrants are linked to the political system through social connections); Agbényiga et al., supra note 48, at 308 (finding that a lack of social connections decreases refugees’ well-being).
175 Phillimore, Implementing Integration, supra note 58, at 538.
176 Some refugees may have been introduced to features of the U.S. legal system prior to arriving in the United States. After the U.S. State Department and
Homeland Security approves a refugee’s application for resettlement to the United
States, “most refugees undergo a brief cultural orientation course prior to departure
for the United States.” It appears that pre-arrival orientation is available only in
nine locations globally.
Refugees, and Migration, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
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rights foundation on which other domains of integration rest. By
contributing to this foundational element, these programs indirectly
support the other integration domains. Moreover, because the
workshops involve dozens of lawyers, judges, teachers, and students, they directly help to establish the social bridges domain between refugees and the communities within which they settle. Ironically,
these
community-based
workshops
also
reflect
neoliberalism’s enthusiasm for the role of the community sector as
an alternative to government-provided social support.
Interactive law and justice workshops can also advance a narrower policy of economic self-sufficiency. Congress itself has underscored the link between jobs and a newcomer’s understanding of
his or her rights and responsibilities. It adopted the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act in July 2014 to increase “access to and
opportunities for the employment, education, training, and support
services [individuals] need to succeed in the labor market,” among
other goals.177 A stated purpose of the legislation is to “assist immigrants and other individuals who are English language learners
in . . . acquiring an understanding of the American system of Government, individual freedom, and the responsibilities of citizenship.”178 In other words, to fully participate in the U.S. labor force,
refugees and immigrants need to be familiar with the system of justice in the United States.
4. A PRACTICAL PROPOSAL

http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/JTJ5-2WHQ] (last visited Feb. 20 2017). At least one report has
criticized this pre-departure orientation as insufficient. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS, supra note 63, at 10. Who We Are,
ORIENTATION
RESOURCE
EXCHANGE,
CULTURAL
http://coresourceexchange.org/about/who-we-serve/
[https://perma.cc/DKV4-CEXP] (last visted Feb. 18, 2017). Another evaluation
noted that the program emphasizes the need to seek employment as soon as possible. Julie M. Kornfeld, Overseas Cultural Orientation Programmes and Resettled Refugees’ Perceptions, 41 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 53, 53 (2010).
177 Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, 29 U.S.C. § 3101(1) (2015). This
act succeded its predecessor, the 1998 Workforce Investment Act. See infra note 189.
178 Id. § 3271(4)(B) (2015) (referencing the Adult Education and Literacy subchapter).
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This Section proposes that communities with sufficient resources can work to provide an interactive, multicultural, and multilinguistic opportunity for refugees to learn about their legal rights
and responsibilities in their new home. The Section describes a collaborative workshop on law for refugees in Spokane, Washington as
a possible model for other communities to follow to strengthen refugee integration.
In Spokane and elsewhere, nonprofit organizations working
with refugees, prosecutors, judges, police, public defenders, and educators have recognized a need to provide information to refugees
and immigrants about their legal rights and responsibilities and the
system enforcing them.179
One of the significant hurdles refugees face upon resettlement is
society’s expectation that they comply with legal norms. Expecting
everyone within the borders to adhere to U.S. law is reasonable and
necessary for public safety. Nonetheless, many Americans who are
citizens by birth inadvertently run afoul of unfamiliar laws. The
same is truer for new transplants to the United States. Yet, as even
many first-year law students are surprised to learn, lacking
knowledge of a law does not make a lawbreaker less culpable.
Breaking a law, particularly a criminal law, comes with harsh
consequences. The implications of merely being suspected of a
criminal violation can be devastating. Temporary detention can result in the loss of a job, triggering the loss of housing as well.
The stakes are even higher for resettled refugees and other immigrants who have not yet gained citizenship. As of January 2017,
refugees and other immigrants who have not become naturalized
citizens are given priority for removal from the United States if they
“[h]ave committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal offense,” regardless of whether they were charged or convicted, and
irrespective of the magnitude of the offense.180

179 See ABANDONED UPON ARRIVAL, supra note 8, at 10 (referring to an interview
with Nancy Chamberlin, Deputy Chief of police, during which she noted that many
refugees are leery of police because of prior persecution in other countries and that
some tend not to understand basic laws rooted in U.S. culture).
180 Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (Jan. 25, 2017). Such proceedings
do not mean automatic expulsion, but rather an administrative hearing to determine if a culpable refugee should be expelled. And accusations of a violation may
prompt a plea bargain to a lesser offense—whether committed or not—that also
triggers removal proceedings. In the past, violations could subject a refugee to deportation proceedings. Individuals admitted as refugees who have not gained U.S.
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There are several criminal laws that a refugee lacking familiarity
with U.S. legal culture might inadvertently violate. Child welfare
laws serve as an example as illustrated by the following occurrence.
A newly resettled couple from a refugee camp in East Africa parked
their car in a shop’s parking lot for a quick errand. They left their
two children in the car with the windows open an inch or two and
the doors unlocked. Prosecutors charged the parents with child endangerment. While the outside temperature was about 70 degrees,
prosecutors argued that the interior temperatures could have escalated sufficiently to result in harm to the two children. For the parents, 70 degrees did not seem warm enough to cause concern. Moreover, it was common practice in their home country to leave children
in unlocked cars for short periods when shopping at traditional
open-air markets.181
To help address the challenges of refugees who lack an understanding of legal norms in the United States, a small group of law
professors (including this Author), lawyers, and community college
English-as-a-second language (“ESL”) instructors in Spokane convened to provide information to refugees on U.S. law and legal processes.
Spokane, like some other mid-sized cities in the United States,
has been receiving an increasing number of resettled refugees.182 For
a variety of reasons, some states, and particular communities within

citizenship can be deported for a variety of criminal offenses. See Vong Xiong v.
Gonzales, 484 F.3d 530, 533–34 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a person who entered
the United States as a refugee could be placed in removal procedings because of an
aggravated felony conviction, even though his refugee status had not been terminated); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006) (detailing the criminal offenses that will
result in the deportation of previously admitted refugees).
181 While details of this occurrence have been altered, central elements accurately reflect an incident in Spokane, Washington. E-mail from Francis Adewale,
Spokane, WA City Public Defender, to Author (Nov. 7, 2016) (on file with the Author).
182 World Relief Spokane Email (Nov. 3, 2016) (on file with the Author) [hereinafter World Relief Spokane Email]. These numbers only count the refugees initially resettled in Spokane and do not take into consideration refugees who might
have moved here after being resettled elsewhere. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated in 2016 that the population of Spokane County was 499,072. QuickFacts: Spokane City, Washington; Spokane County, Washington, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/spokanecitywashington,spokanecountywashington/PST045216 [https://perma.cc/4DDQ-RUP2].
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those states, receive more resettled refugees than others.183 According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of
Refugee Resettlement, 3,233 refugees were resettled in Washington
State during the fiscal year ending in September 2016. Washington
ranked eighth in the nation in terms of the number of refugees resettled during that year.184 The total number of refugees resettled in
Spokane from 2007 through 2016 is 4,486.185
Possibly the first area-wide program to address refugees’ lack of
familiarity with legal norms came from Community College of Spokane’s Adult Education Center (“CCS AEC”). Since 2002, CCS AEC
has been receiving U.S. Department of Education grants to provide
civics instruction to students enrolled in ESL courses.186 Initially, as

183 Government agencies determine the locations in which refugees will be resettled based on a variety of factors including existing communities or relatives, the
strength of the location’s nonprofit resettlement partner, the cost of housing, the
availability of jobs, access to health care, and consultation with state and county
officials. Harris, supra note 43, at 35–36, n.13. See Josh Sanburn, These 6 States Take
in The Most Syrian Refugees, TIME (Sept. 10, 2016), http://time.com/4029719/syrianrefugees-us-relocate/ [https://perma.cc/GUJ6-HCEU] (reporting that factors determining resettlement locations also includes the availability of housing). See generally ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES , U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVICES,
ORR INDICATORS FOR REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT STAKEHOLDERS FISCAL YEAR 2015 9–11
(Jan. 23, 2017) [Hereinafter ORR INDICATORS] (but note secondary migration from
initial host).
184 The Refugee Processing Center reports information on refugee arrivals.
REFUGEE PROCESSING CTR., INTERACTIVE REPORTING ARRIVAL REPORTS (last visited
Feb.
19,
2017),
http://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals
[https://perma.cc/4BGC-FNCC] (showing, when you navigate to ‘Interactive Reporting’ in the ‘Reports’ tab and enter the date range for Fiscal Year 2016, that seven
states receiving more refugees than Washington were, starting with the highest
number: California, Texas, New York, Michigan, Ohio, Arizona, and North Carolina). This is an increase from the 2015 fiscal year, ending in September, when
Washington ranked 10th. ORR INDICATORS, supra note 183 (identifying the nine
states receiving more refugees than Washington in FY 2015 as, starting with the
highest number: Texas, California, New York, Arizona, Michigan, Ohio, Georgia,
Pennsylvania, and Illinois).
185 World Relief Spokane Email, supra note 182.
186 Interview with Kathy Laise, ESL Instructor and Civics Coordinator, Community Colleges of Spokane (Sept. 27, 2016) [Hereinafter Interview with Kathy
Laise]. The grants were awarded pursuant to the Workforce Innovation Act. See
Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), Pub. L. No. 113-128, § 243, 128
Stat. 1624 (2014) (regulating the awarding of federal grants for the purpose of integrated English literacy and civics education); see also supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text.
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part of the civics instruction, lawyers visited ESL classes to introduce the U.S. system of government and legal structure with the
help of interpreters.187
In 2013, I joined with the ESL civics program, other lawyers, and
a refugee advocacy NGO to present a multilingual, multicultural,
half-day workshop on U.S. Law and Justice for Refugees and Immigrants. The core team creating the workshop consisted of three key
individuals and the organizations we represented. A Spokane city
public defender, who also served on the board of directors of the
nonprofit organization Refugee Connections Spokane, was distressed with defending refugees who did not understand the laws
they had allegedly broken.188 For this reason, he wished to provide
Spokane’s refugee community with more in-depth legal training
than that which had been offered through the ESL courses. I learned
of his aspirations through my volunteer work with the same nonprofit organization. The nonprofit had already established a working relationship with the community college center that teaches English to refugees along with civics instruction. With the public
defender identifying the areas of law that refugees most frequently
violate, I developed a curriculum, working in collaboration with the
ESL instructors and CCS AEC staff who provided the participants,
knew their languages and cultural backgrounds, and had a budget
for civics education. Thus, a public defender, law professor, and
ESL teacher combined efforts with support from Refugee Connections Spokane, Gonzaga University School of Law, and Community
Colleges of Spokane to create this workshop. A number of other
volunteers bolstered these efforts.
The three of us worked together to present variations of this
workshop in October 2013, February 2015, and March, 2016.
•

The 2013 workshop included about 140 refugees and
immigrants, representing over fourteen different languages. Most of the substantive instruction took
place in ten language-based breakout sessions.

187 Most of the students in these courses were refugees and immigrants who
had relocated to Spokane, not visiting foreign students. Interview with Kathy
Laise, supra note 186.
188 Interview with Francis Adewale, then Chair of the Board of Directors, Refugee Connections Spokane, and Spokane Public Defender (Aug. 14, 2013).
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The 2015 workshop reached over 180 refugees and
immigrants, representing about sixteen languages.
Much of the instruction occurred in nine languagebased breakout sessions.

•

The 2016 workshop included 160 refugees and immigrants, representing over fifteen different languages.
The majority of substantive instruction took place in
twelve language-based groups.

•

Each workshop included a breakout session for a
mixed language group with no interpretation led by
ESL-trained lawyers.
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While Spokane’s collaboration fell into place almost inadvertently, other communities can intentionally work to create a similar
team. ESL programs across the nation receive Department of Education grants for ESL/Civics instruction.189 These resources have
covered most of the costs of the workshops described here and could
help to fund similar collaborative programs for refugees in other
communities. Much of the remainder of this article provides more
detail with the hope that others can replicate and improve this initiative to help refugees and their communities work towards integration.
This section outlines the workshops’ general goals, structure, logistics, and alterations over its three iterations.
4.1. Goals and Structure
The workshop collaborators have maintained four goals for the
workshops: 1) to foster a positive view of the U.S. legal system and
189 See Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), supra note 186, §
243 (providing funding for integrated English literacy and civics education); see also
Adult Education and Literacy, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION (last visited Feb. 19,
2017),
https://ed.gov/about/offices/list/ovae/pi/AdultEd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/J24L-L6GA] (describing the Office of Career, Technical, and
Adult Education’s role in providing integrated English literacy and civics education
grants). Congress authorized grants to states for ESL/Civics instruction under the
1998 Workforce Investment Act. MICHELLE TOLBERT, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
LITERACY, ENGLISH LITERACY AND CIVICS EDUCATION FOR ADULT LEARNERS 8–9 (Aug.
2001). Congress repealed the WIA effective 2015, when it enacted WIOA. Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA), supra note 186, § 511(a).
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state actors, given that many refugees and immigrants come from
places where legal authority figures represent a threat; 2) to explain
the purpose of the criminal justice system and the consequences of
violations, particularly on immigration status; 3) to identify key civil
rights and liberties; and 4) to provide information in writing to each
participant in their first language.
The first goal is crucial as it addresses the very core of why refugees were initially displaced. A person becomes a refugee after
being forced by fear of persecution to leave his or her country.190 The
1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 protocol do not define persecution, but domestic and regional law fill this gap. To rise to the level
of persecution, the United States and other jurisdictions determine
that acts must either be committed by a state actor or the state must
be unwilling or unable to protect the person claiming refugee status
from the persecution of private actors.191 Refugees, then, have cause
to be fearful or suspicious of state actors. Accordingly, we wanted
to put a human face to aspects of the legal system. Each of the workshops included discussions with uniformed police officers, judges,
lawyers, and law students.
The 2016 workshop benefitted from an address by Justice Mary
Yu of the Washington Supreme Court who is the daughter of two
immigrants herself. Her distribution of pocket-sized U.S. Constitutions to the participants was a highlight of the day. A uniformed
police officer visited each small group during that workshop and
provided “Emergency Language Cards” for limited English proficient refugees and immigrants to keep with them.192 Judging by the
number of requests for photos with the Justice and police officer, the

190

ugee”).

See supra note 19, and accompanying text (explaining the definition of “ref-

Id.
Refugee Connections Spokane developed the wallet-sized cards and
worked with the Spokane Police Department to train officers to ask limited-English
speaking residents if they had a card. Each card included space for contact information for a person who could interpret in an emergency.
191
192
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workshop succeeded in presenting state actors as human and approachable.193 These interactions contributed to the social links element of integration that refers to connections between refugees and
government entities.194
Collaborators constructed the curriculum to meet the second
and third goals. To explain the purpose of the criminal justice system and the consequences of violations, the second goal, city prosecutors and public defenders helped to identify the most important
substantive areas of law to address—areas where they tend to see
refugees having issues. They identified domestic violence as the
most important topic, followed by issues related to children, including abuse and neglect. To provide a context for these laws, the curriculum addressed the general framework of the criminal justice system, beginning with constitutional principles and the rule of law.
To identify key civil rights and liberties, the third goal, collaborators considered areas in which refugees and immigrants commonly experience discrimination and presented information on legal protective norms. The curriculum has addressed rights of
people stopped by police or other authorities, the rights of children
and parents in public schools, and rights related to housing and the
workplace.
This substantive instruction occurred mostly in small, languagebased groups to facilitate communication in the participants’ first
language. Volunteer lawyers teaching these groups introduced topics with scenarios based largely on actual occurrences involving refugees. Each participant received a translated handout with basic legal rules that applied to the scenarios. The groups then worked
through the scenarios in an interactive manner. Some of these
groupings supported the social bonds domain of integration by
helping refugees establish connections with “like-ethnic groups.”195
Two volunteer lawyers, judges, law professors, or law students
taught each of the break-out groups. These volunteers followed the
same curriculum—presented as a detailed script—but allowed for

193 In attempting to present the less intimidating human side to legal actors,
we could not ignore the fact that minorities in the United States can face considerable risks in interactions with police. See infra, Section 4.4.
194 Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 181 (describing social links as “the connection between individuals and structures of the state”).
195 Id. at 178 (explaining the benefits refugees gain from connecting with “likeethnic groups”).
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deviation to meet the needs and interests of their groups. All but
one break-out group worked with an interpreter. The group with
no interpreter included students with languages only spoken by one
or two participants. The two lawyers teaching this session had
worked as ESL instructors, and CCS ESL instructors also provided
assistance.
Some of the substantive information on the general system of
justice was conveyed in an initial plenary session presented by honorary speakers or others. Though these sessions were somewhat
chaotic, with interpreters speaking 10 to 14 languages at once in a
room holding over 200 people, they proved energetic and informative.
4.2. Logistics
The law and CCS partnership was critical for success. Importantly, the CCS ESL students comprised almost all the workshop
participants.196 Drawing on ESL students as the workshop participants meant that some newly-arrived refugees were excluded. Most
of the students in the CCS ESL classes were refugees and immigrants
who had secured either state or federal benefits through Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) or Refugee Cash Assistance.197
All Spokane area recipients of these benefits are referred to CCS ESL
classes. Some TANF beneficiaries are required to enroll in ESL
courses as a corollary of participating in other required work-related
activities. Elderly refugees, those with sufficient English-language
capacity, and those able to secure employment without ESL instruction were likely omitted from participation in the workshops.
Including primarily ESL students in the workshops allowed organizers to forecast the language groups and numbers within each

196 While CCS records indicate that most of their ESL students were resettled
refugees, others were immigrants with various visa statuses. The workshop collaborators made no effort to identify or distinguish among them. For each of the three
workshops, all ESL teachers were invited to bring their class to the workshops.
Only one teacher declined the invitation during one of the workshops.
197 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement provides refugee cash assistance (RCA) for up to eight months after arrival to qualifying refugees who are not eligible for TANF. Kerwin, supra note 41,
at 11.
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one in advance of the workshop. With this information, we could
arrange sufficient instructional space for each breakout group, provide the correct number of handouts on the law and legal system
translated into the languages of the participants, and ensure the
availability of interpreters. Organizers hoped that participants
would share the translated material and additional information with
others in their community who did not participate. Providing translations and interpretation supported the language and cultural
knowledge domain of integration. As Ager and Strang identify,
“[f]ostering community integration potentially means reducing barriers to key information through the provision of material translated
into the languages of refugees and other migrants.”198
The workshops also relied on CCS’s coordination and
ESL/Civics budget. CCS hired former students and others to translate the written handouts and serve as interpreters during the workshop. CCS also arranged for buses to pick up ESL classes at four
different locations in the city and transport participants to and from
the workshop site. For the first two workshops, CCS also provided
the workshop space. Finally, CCS provided light snacks during
each of the workshops, as well as notepads and pens for participants.
The workshops have depended on anywhere from twenty to
fifty volunteer judges, lawyers, law professors, law students, police,
and others. Many of the volunteer teachers and presenters in the
second and third iterations were repeat players, including students
who had graduated and returned as lawyers to teach. Most volunteers indicated that they gained more than they gave through their
participation. The workshops provided an opportunity for the local
legal community and law students to interact with a population that
is often invisible to them. Accordingly, the workshops served to
build the social bridges domain through linking refugees with supportive members of their new community.199
I also presented an hour-long orientation session for the volunteer teachers prior to each workshop. Orientation topics included:
the curriculum content, the types of questions participants might

Ager & Strang, supra note 11, at 182.
See id. at 179–80 (describing the importance of building relationships between refugees and their host community and noting the value of refugees encountering friendly people in their daily lives in order to feel at home).
198
199
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ask (and possible responses), and best practices in working with interpreters.
Two evaluations were conducted after each workshop. I created
a short questionnaire in very basic English for the participants. ESL
teachers distributed the evaluation questions to their students and
helped them work through the language. Some of the participants’
comments have been very instructive, reflecting the value of these
workshops.200 In addition, I invited all of the volunteers to convene
shortly after each workshop to discuss strengths and weaknesses of
the workshop from their perspective.
4.3. Challenges and Subsequent Alterations
With each presentation of the workshop, the evaluations and
other observations identified issues or ideas to address in subsequent workshop iterations. These are addressed below.
4.3.1. Content Versus Time
A four-and-a-half-hour window represents less than two hours
of instructional time in light of language interpretation, breaks, and
transitions between rooms. While organizers added a half-hour
since the first workshop, the timeframe has not since expanded further because the participants manage so many competing demands.
In addition, there was an observable saturation as the participants
struggled to understand the language (before interpretation) as well
as the new legal concepts.
These time restraints mean hard choices in terms of selecting
content, for which there is no easy model. Each year collaborators
shifted the content slightly, increased the amount of small-group
time, and shortened the plenary sessions. Each change in content
200 Of the seventy-two participants who completed an evaluation from the
2016 workshop, seventy reported that they agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: “I learned important information in this workshop.” Comments following
that statement included: “Child abuse and neglect are different from my country,”
and “Domestic violence is very important.” Other general comments included: “I
learned how the police can help me;” “I was very happy to see the judge;” and “All
people are friendly!”. (Evaluations on file with Author).
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has meant reworking the translated written materials, which adds
an additional expense.
To help augment the restricted curriculum, the nonprofit cosponsor coordinated additional information and resources for the
last workshop. During the half-hour refreshment break, ten advocacy, governmental, and social service organizations staffed tables
in a common area, many with resources printed in different languages.201 The nonprofit organization also staffed a general table
with resources translated into various languages.202 This resource
opportunity further supported the integration domains of social
bridges and links, as well as language and cultural knowledge.
The limited time also impacted the management of participants’
questions. One approach was to take questions in writing throughout the workshop, ask the interpreters to translate them, and address common themes during the final plenary session. This was
less than ideal. A subsequent approach managed questions within
the small groups. This put more pressure on the volunteer teachers,
but the use of two volunteers with different areas of legal expertise
in each group helped in this regard. Plus, accumulated experience
has allowed organizers to forecast some of the difficult questions
and prepare volunteers during the volunteer orientation to address
these. Fielding questions in small groups also ran the risk of discouraging questions from participants who did not wish to ask them
directly. To ease this problem, each participant received a note pad
and was presented with the option of submitting anonymous written questions. No one took advantage of this alternative. Another
201 Organizations included the Spokane Volunteer Lawyer’s Program, Catholic Charities, Northwest Justice Project, TeamChild, Northwest Fair Housing Alliance, State Minority and Justice Commission, State Interpreter Commission, Spokane Police Department, Refugee Connections Spokane, and the Washington
Defenders Association. Workshop organizers recognized that tabling during a
break at an event might be a practice unfamiliar to some. Accordingly, ESL instructors helped set the stage in advance by describing to participants this informal practice. In addition, ESL instructors and interpreters were available to facilitate communication between those staffing the tables and participants.
202 These materials included, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union’s “Know Your Rights” in Arabic, Spanish, and Farsi; Northwest Immigrant
Rights Project’s “Domestic Violence: Questions and Answers for Immigrants and
Refugees” in Spanish, Vietnamese, and Chinese; Northwest Justice Project’s
“School Rights for Immigrant and Refugee Children and Their Parents in Washington State” in Spanish and Russian; and Federal Trade Commission information on
notario fraud. A grant from the Law Foundation of Washington covered the cost of
printing these materials.
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approach to help with questions was to proactively provide information in as many languages as possible through the tabling referenced above.
4.3.2. Language Interpretation
The interpreters for the breakout groups were not professional
interpreters and many had difficulty with complex language. For
every iteration, I simplified the curriculum script to use plain language and simple construction. Interpreters received the curriculum in advance of the workshop. The shoestring budget meant that
interpreters were not paid for preparation time. While some have
gone as far as writing out a translation of the materials for themselves, not all were able to become so well acquainted with the curriculum.
To help interpreters, I encouraged volunteer teachers during
their orientation session to avoid legal jargon, colloquialisms, and
complex language. I also warned guest speakers of this barrier in
advance and urged them to use short sentences and plain language.
4.3.3. Physical Facilities
The workshop facilities require, at a minimum: one room large
enough to hold at least 230 people; at least fourteen separate rooms
of varying sizes for breakout sessions, a volunteer staging area, and
lunch for visiting speakers; an area to accommodate refreshments
for 200 or more people; and an area for informational tables during
the refreshment break. In addition, the workshop should be centrally located with parking and be available at no cost when ESL
classes are in session. The first two workshop spaces required placing different small language groups in the same room and were less
than ideal. Locating the 2016 workshop at Gonzaga School of Law
during its spring break worked well.
4.3.4. Photos and Media Coverage
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Media coverage presents a dilemma. On one hand, the workshops are newsworthy events. News outlet coverage provides a
framework for educating the general public on barriers faced by refugees and immigrants in the community. Reporting also informs
the community that newcomers, educators, and legal actors are joining together to minimize those obstacles. On the other hand, there
is no media coverage without photos and video and many refugees
and immigrants do not wish to have their images captured or broadcast. Concerns run the gamut from fear of reprisals on family remaining in violent conflict situations to the possible discovery of an
immigrant’s undocumented status. The compromises incorporated
during the 2016 workshop seemed successful. These included:
•

Inviting specific television and print reporters who
had previously covered refugee issues in the community and who agreed to take images from the back of
the large plenary session, capturing only the backs of
participants’ heads.203

•

Arranging through the co-sponsoring NGO a former
refugee who volunteered to meet with media for individual interviews.

•

Organizing individual interviews with guest speakers.

•

Providing a volunteer professional photographer
who took portraits of willing individuals or groups
during the refreshment break. He operated in a separate room to ensure his subjects had signed a plainlanguage photo release form and that he would not
inadvertently capture someone else’s image.204 He

203 Organizers also located in the upper balcony of the plenary session room
the language groups that have indicated concern over photos in the past so that not
even the backs of their heads would be captured. In addition, collaborators sought
advance approval from interpreters because they generally face the audience for
whom they interpret, and thus, faced the cameras set up in the back of the plenary
room.
204 The CCS collaborator provided the text of this photo release form to ESL
instructors in advance of the workshop so that students could understand the content of the release.
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posted these photos on a website to which all participants had the URL.
•

Asking the ESL instructors to explain to students in
advance of the workshop that participants might see
cameras, but that only the backs of heads would be
included in photographs taken at the event absent
authorization.

4.4. Specific Content Issues: Domestic Violence and Police Violence
There is a fine line between portraying legal actors, including
police, as accessible, honest, and humane, and recognizing that police violence poses a risk for refugees and immigrants nationwide.
The curriculum addressed this tension in two ways. First, the materials and speakers conveyed the message that the criminal justice
system is not perfect and much could change to protect minority
populations.205 Second, the curriculum included a segment on police stops. For example, recognizing that the practice in some cultures is for the driver to exit the vehicle, the curriculum instructed
on the dangers of doing so in the United States. Underscoring a related risk, the police officer who distributed emergency language
cards instructed recipients not to reach for them quickly during a
police stop.
Domestic violence, including child abuse, is also difficult for
some groups. All groups included both men and women, and there
was a possibility that anyone could have been an offender or a victim. The translated written materials provided contact information
and resources for victims. Because different groups have vocalized
disagreement with domestic violence rules during earlier workshop
renditions, organizers amended the materials and volunteer training to emphasize two points. First, the instruction is not intended to
generate agreement with the rules, but to highlight legal norms and

205 The curriculum addresses possible discrimination in the criminal justice
system. The chief of police made this point during the 2015 workshop in his address to participants.
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consequences of violations. Second, volunteer instructors are prepared for questions about how families can legally address family
conflict, including child discipline.

4.5. Next Steps
Changes to the workshop format and process, as well as additional interactive opportunities, could help advance the role of community-based legal workshops in strengthening the social bridges
element of integration.206
Within the current workshop format, for example, the organizers could involve refugees more in revising the curriculum and in
workshop planning beyond making adjustments based on refugees’
evaluative comments. More time could be included for participants
to address the legal systems and cultures in their country of origin
so that learning can be more cross-cultural.
In addition, collaborators could train refugee community leaders on legal rights and on resources that provide legal help and information. Training could assist these leaders in facilitating access
to these resources within their communities.207 Leaders could then
help others understand when they might have a right to legal protection and how to go about investigating options for asserting their
rights.
Finally, a common theme that has run throughout the three
workshop renditions involves U.S. law and cultural norms surrounding gender roles and family relations. Invariably, participants
seek more information on parenting, disciplining children, and resolving family conflicts. Some groups also express concern over
gender roles both within and outside of families.208 Other observers
have commented on the lack of resources provided by the U.S. re-

206 These conclusions stem solely from the Author’s observations and have not
emerged as part of the collaborative workshop process.
207 For example, accessing Washington State’s civil legal aid resources is a challenge, even for those who speak English well.
208 One volunteer teacher recalls a male participant proclaiming that “the U.S.
has rights only for women.” Interview with Mary Pat Treuthart (Jan. 20, 2017).
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settlement process to address the challenges of parenting and mentoring children in what is, for many, a profoundly different cultural
environment.209 A productive follow-up step could involve creating
workshops concentrating specifically on these sensitive issues.
5. CONCLUSION
National security and refugee protection are not mutually exclusive. The United States can work to protect its security and simultaneously uphold its humanitarian and legal commitment to protect
refugees. Integration of resettled refugees can complement rather
than weaken national security.
As a UNHCR resettlement state, the United States has an obligation to promote the integration of the refugees it admits. A two-way
process of integration can enhance successful resettlement and bolster the security of refugees and the communities in which they relocate.
To date, the United States refugee resettlement program has not
effectively promoted sustainable resettlement nor met the UNHCR
mandate to facilitate integration. The program’s singular focus on
rapid economic self-sufficiency makes long-term economic independence difficult for some refugees to attain and does little to address other elements deemed central to integration. The assumption
that refugees can successfully resettle by immediate participation in
the work force reflects a free-market approach to social welfare that
analysts have disparaged, especially since the 2008 financial crisis.
Local communities can support refugee integration even in the
absence of a U.S. integration policy. Community welcoming efforts
are even more important when national anti-immigrant sentiment
incubates hostile environments. A community workshop to help
refugees become familiar with their legal rights and obligations is
just one example of an initiative that facilitates integration. It does
so by strengthening the rights and citizenship foundation of integration and contributing to the domains of social connections, and language and cultural knowledge.

209 Hing, supra note 139, at 1898 (addressing the lack of resources provided to
refugees to help them aquire long-term parenting skills in a new environment
where “old country approaches” fail).
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Integration represents more than a public policy challenge for
resettlement states or an experiment in theory for scholars. Local
integration efforts centered on law have produced tangible benefits.
Participants’ evaluations consistently indicate they have learned important information. City prosecutors dismissed charges against
three refugees who participated in the workshops following their
alleged infractions.210 Others hopefully have used their knowledge
of the criminal justice system to avoid violations. Some may have
sought an interpreter at a child’s school or asserted other rights introduced to them. Dozens of volunteer lawyers now understand
more about this diverse population, including shared desires to
keep families safe and connected and to invest in children’s futures.
Such interactions can cultivate mutual safety and wellbeing by blurring the imaginary line between “us” and “them.”

210 E-mail from Justin Bingham, Spokane City Prosecutor, to Author (Jan. 16,
2017) (on file with Author) (noting that none of the three have returned with subsequent charges to the best of his knowledge).
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